EditIn Erdoğan’s footsteps: Serbia’s slide from spin-driven rule toward open dictatorship
Vučić’s policy is focused on preserving a clientelist and corrupt system of power based on transactional arrangements
The European Union must abandon its inconsistent approach and policy of “appeasement” toward an increasingly authoritarian regime and move toward concrete action, writes Prof. Duško Lopandić.
Prof. Duško Lopandić is former ambassador of Serbia to the EU, Vice President of Party Serbia Centre
On the southeastern edge of Belgrade, a road historically known as the “Constantinople Road” once led travelers toward today’s Istanbul. For centuries, conquering armies passed along this route as they moved from Europe toward Asia Minor and beyond. Recent political developments in Serbia suggest that President Aleksandar Vučić is now leading his country down a similar path—one that increasingly resembles the trajectory taken by Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, toward consolidated authoritarian rule and growing geopolitical distance from Europe. This process recalls Erdoğan’s own transformation, when he evolved from a potential reformer into an autocratic ruler who systematically suppressed political opposition, independent media, and democratic institutions.
After a full year of mass protests in Serbia, the Vučić regime has intensified its grip on power through the consolidation of complete, extra-institutional control over the so-called “ministries of force”—the police, security services, and the military. This has been accompanied by increased pressure on the media and the propaganda apparatus, as well as open repression and retaliation against key pillars of social resistance, particularly in education, the academic and scientific community, culture, and certain independent institutions. At the same time, the authorities have shown a growing disregard for the positions and demands of representatives of the European Union. In December 2025, Vučić boycotted the EU–Western Balkans summit, and in January 2026 he avoided meeting a European Parliament fact-finding mission sent to Serbia.
Few, however, expected the regime to go a step further and move to brutally curtail the autonomy of the judiciary—directly contradicting the constitutional reforms adopted in 2022. At the end of January 2026, under an expedited procedure and without public debate, Serbia’s National Assembly passed legislative amendments that seriously undermine the independence of judges and prosecutors. These measures were adopted despite protests from the professional community—judges, prosecutors, and lawyers—and in open disregard of procedures agreed with the European Union, which require such systemic reforms to be reviewed in advance by the European Commission and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.
These developments followed a wave of political violence over the summer, when law enforcement forces, acting in coordination with regime “loyalists” —including individuals linked to criminal networks, hooligan groups, and activists of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party—violently confronted participants in civic and student protests in Belgrade and other cities across the country. Serbia has since become, after Turkey, the first EU candidate country to hold political prisoners. Repression has continued through systematic “purges” in the education sector, including the dismissal of schoolteachers and university staff and attempts to politically take over governing bodies of faculties and other institutions that expressed support for student protests.
Amid the global geopolitical turmoil following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the radical shift in U.S. foreign policy under Donald Trump’s administration, Vučić sought to carve out an opportunity for himself. Yet despite symbolic gestures toward Moscow and Beijing, as well as efforts to ingratiate himself with Washington, Serbia has faced tangible negative consequences including the activation of sanctions against Serbia’s oil company, NIS, majority-owned by the Russian energy giant Gazprom. After prolonged hesitation, only recently only recently was a preliminary agreement reached to transfer ownership of NIS to Hungary’s MOL.
Unlike Erdoğan’s Turkey, Serbia lacks what former Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu once called “strategic depth.” Its population is rapidly aging and shrinking, while its economy—trade, investment, and the financial sector—is overwhelmingly tied to the European Union. Serbia is almost entirely surrounded by NATO and/or EU member states, making it unclear for what purpose the regime is allocating an ever-growing share of GDP to military spending. At the same time, Serbia’s regional “soft power” is declining, in part due to aggressive nationalist rhetoric and the concept of a “Serbian world,” modeled on Russia’s “Russian world,” which has generated deep mistrust among neighboring countries.
The Vučić regime’s greatest foreign policy failure, however, lies in its inability to seize the renewed momentum of EU enlargement triggered by the war in Ukraine. Serbia was considered in 2018 a frontrunner in the accession process. Yet democratic backsliding and the refusal to align with EU foreign policy—most notably regarding sanctions against Russia—have led to a complete freeze in negotiations, which have not advanced since the end of 2021. In the meantime, Montenegro has begun closing negotiation chapters, and Albania has opened all chapters in record time. According to the European Commission’s latest report, Serbia now ranks only fifth among candidate countries.
While Vučić continues to rhetorically endorse Serbia’s “European path,” his actual policy is focused on preserving a clientelist and corrupt system of power based on transactional arrangements, regardless of partners. As Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos has warned, the recent assault on judicial autonomy represents a clear regression in European reforms, adding to last year’s European Commission’s assessment of backsliding in freedom of expression and academic freedom.
The European Union must abandon its inconsistent approach and policy of “appeasement” toward an increasingly authoritarian regime and move toward concrete action: financial pressure on the government, targeted sanctions against those responsible for repression, corruption, and electoral manipulation, alongside sustained support for civil society, independent institutions, and democratic actors. EPP should expel SNS from its ranks, as it is not a pro-European party and its leader openly supported Orbán against the EPP’s Hungarian member party.
Serbia is once again at a crossroads. The EU cannot remain passive as the country chooses between the path of Erdoğan’s Turkey on one side and European democracy on the other. Vučić’s regime cannot be reformed from within. A positive signal from within Serbia comes from pro-European opposition parties that have recently agreed on steps toward closer coordination ahead of elections expected later this year.
The only viable alternative is sustained support for the democratic movement led today by the pro-European opposition, students, and civil society.
Caption: A protester holds a card depicting Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic reading ‘Liar!’ during a student demonstration in Belgrade, Serbia, 27 January 2026. Students are rallying to demand core changes to educational reforms and early elections. The demonstrations are part of a wave of civil unrest that began following the fatal canopy collapse at the Novi Sad railway station in late 2024, with protesters calling for increased accountability and social justice. EPA/ANDREJ CUKIC
Updated: February 2, 2026 - 06:38
