EditIceland’s black eye for the EU
The addition of Iceland a wealthy, stable, democratic country already closely aligned with its rules and principles would have been a positive for the EU
The result was also an unhappy reminder of the Brexit vote as it demonstrated the continuing potency of concerns about sovereignty and identity that lay at the heart of the Brexit movement – concerns to which the EU core continues to be blind, writes Dick Roche.
EUalive’s columnist Dick Roche is a former Irish Minister for European Affairs. He was in charge of the two referendums for the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. His columns can be found here.
The question put to Iceland’s 265,000 voters in the referendum on 29 August was not whether Iceland should join the EU. Voters were asked whether they agreed that negotiations on the EU membership application – which Iceland lodged in 2009 and withdrew in 2015 – could be reopened. Had the result in the referendum on 29th August been ‘Yes’, negotiations would have been reopened. The results of those negotiations would be put to Iceland’s citizens in a further referendum, asking voters to support or reject the resulting EU membership deal.
The question put in the referendum gave Iceland’s citizens an option to ‘hedge their bets’. They could vote for negotiations to open with the EU, see the results and then decide whether to join or not. Vote yes to see – “Já til að sjá”- became a campaign slogan for the YES side. The majority of the voters in a high turnout referendum still decided to vote No – a decision Brussels should not ignore.
The road to the referendum
Iceland’s 2024 general election was triggered by the collapse of the three-party coalition government over a range of issues. The election that followed was fought across economic issues – particularly inflation and interest rates – housing affordability, and concerns about public services, especially healthcare quality. Immigration and asylum, issues on which the parties in the outgoing government had differed, also featured. Iceland had experienced very significant immigration in the previous decade.
In the election the parties that had governed since 2017 were badly mauled. Their combined vote was slashed from over 54% to under 30%.
Following the election another three party coalition government formed, comprising Iceland’s Social Democratic Alliance, the Liberal Reform Party and the Peoples’ Party. These parties together won 50.4% of the votes, securing 36 of the 63 seats in the Althingi, Iceland’s parliament.
While EU membership negotiations were not a major issue in the 2024 general election the idea of resuming negotiations was part of the election programmes for the Social Democratic Alliance and the Reform Party.
A challenge in bringing the new coalition together was that the Peoples’ Party, the smaller of the three parties, while not hard line Eurosceptic, was not a supporter of EU membership for Iceland.
That problem was overcome in the ‘Platform for the Coalition Government’, published in December 2024, which contained a commitment that “a national referendum on continuing negotiations on Iceland’s Membership of the European Union will be held no later than 2027”.
The Peoples’ Party leader, Inga Sæland, is credited with the idea of giving Iceland’s voters the right to determine whether negotiating with the EU should proceed.
Interestingly, the same provision in the Platform contained a proposal that “ independent foreign experts” should be tasked with preparing a report “on the advantages and disadvantages of using the Icelandic króna and Iceland’s options in currency matters” suggesting that the drafters of the Platform for the Coalition were thinking beyond joining the EU to benefits to be had from joining the Euro.
The campaign, key players and results
On 6 March the Government formally announced that the referendum would go ahead in August. The announcement caused some surprise. Many had expected voting would come later in the government’s term. Reporting suggests that comments made at Davos by President Trump – subsequently repeated – that the U.S. should acquire Greenland may have triggered an earlier than expected vote.
It took two months for the Icelandic Parliament to process arrangements for the referendum. The referendum resolution was approved on 28 May.
While the parliamentary process was underway the EU’s Commissioner for Fisheries, Costas Kadis gave an interview to the Financial Times. During the interview the Commissioner in an unusual intervention on a very sensitive issue suggested that if Iceland’s accession talks were resumed there was “room for flexibility” regarding concerns about EU fisheries policy.
Commissioner Kadis suggested the EU would be willing to discuss special arrangements for Iceland if EU accession negotiations were resumed. When asked whether Iceland could receive exemptions from the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, Kadis replied that this would form part of the negotiations.
It was always on the cards that fisheries would be a central campaign issue in any Icelandic referendum. Coming when they did the Commissioner’s comments helped anchor the referendum campaign on fisheries. Whatever their intention, the Commissioner’s comments were not helpful.
An energetic campaign
The Althingi approved the referendum resolution on 28 May. Campaigning got underway in June.
Throughout the campaign Prime Minister Frostadóttir of the Social Democratic Alliance and Foreign Minister Gunnarsdóttir of the Liberal Reform Party were highly visible advocating for a Yes vote.
Inga Sæland, the leader of the Peoples’ Party, which as mentioned does not support EU membership, was, unsurprisingly, not part of ‘Yes’ campaign. Ms Sæland did however indicate her intention to vote yes in the referendum – as doing so would give the Icelandic people the opportunity to judge what the EU had to offer Iceland.
The leader of Iceland’s Independence Party Guðrún Hafsteinsdóttir, was the lead political figure on the No campaign.
The Independence Party was part of the government that suspended Iceland’s EC negotiations after the 2013 election. Ms Hafsteinsdóttir argued EU membership was not the solution for Iceland’s current problems, would undermine national sovereignty and would not offer benefits beyond those Iceland already enjoyed through EEA and Schengen membership.
The leader of Iceland’s Progressive Party Lilja Alfreösdóttir similarly argued that Iceland had little to gain from full EU membership and that a “No” vote would protect Iceland’s sovereignty, fisheries and agriculture.
The most powerful force in the referendum campaign – financially, vocally and in terms of on the ground presence – was Iceland’s fishing industry. The industry argued that full EU membership would put Iceland’s fisheries, a key part of the country’s economy, exports and national identity, under the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) undermining control over Iceland’s fishing grounds and quota system. The industry pointed to Ireland as a cautionary example, arguing that the CFP had undermined the Irish fishing industry, removed national control over fisheries management and left Ireland which owned some of Europe’s richest fishing grounds with a disproportionally small fishing quota.
Polling and the vote
Initially polling looked positive for the Yes campaign. A Gallup poll in March 2026 showed 52% intending to vote Yes with 48% voting No. A second poll by Gallup again found 52% in favour, with those opposing down to 47%. By the end of July Gallup was showing a tie with both sides at 50%.
On 29 August 82.5% of eligible voters participated in the referendum – an extraordinarily high referendum turnout – with 52.8% voting No to continuing EU accession negotiations and 47.2% voting Yes – a narrow majority but a decisive defeat.
For those in Iceland who wish to see their country as part of the EU the result on 29 August is clearly a setback. Their desire to see Iceland within the EU is ‘shelved.’ Iceland will remain without the seat at the EU decision making table that they desired.
In practical terms, however, Iceland loses very little. Membership of the EEA means Iceland participates fully in the EU single market enjoying free movement of goods, services, capital, and people with EU member states. Through Schengen participation Iceland’s citizens enjoy passport-free access into the Schengen states. Through EFTA Iceland has access to an extensive network of international free trade agreements.
In many ways the Referendum result was a bigger setback for the EU. Politically it was a setback for the EU’s enlargement strategy. The addition of Iceland a wealthy, stable, democratic country already closely aligned with its rules and principles would have been a positive for the EU. Instead the referendum result was a reputational setback.
The result was also an unhappy reminder of the Brexit vote which preceded it by a decade. It demonstrated the continuing potency of concerns about sovereignty and identity that lay at the heart of the Brexit movement – which the EU core continues to be blind eye.
At a time when the EU is looking to strengthen its Arctic footprint and when the North Atlantic and Arctic region is becoming increasingly important because of geopolitical developments and climate change the ‘No’ vote on 29 August is a particularly unwelcome setback for Brussels.
For those who take the time to dig deeper into the thinking that informed the No vote the result on 29 August carries other uncomfortable messages. As mentioned frequently during the referendum, the result demonstrates a confidence that Iceland can prosper without the EU: that the additional costs that come with full EU membership outweigh the benefits. Another interesting takeaway mentioned in an analysis of the referendum results penned this week by Iceland’s ambassador to the UK is that ‘Europe looks sluggish’ from Reykjavik. Some in Iceland see the EU as burying entrepreneurial talent under the weight of regulation, viewing Iceland’s economic success as too valuable to risk full EU membership: an unflattering perspective.
One other uncomfortable outcome of the referendum campaign for the EU Commission is that it has put a glaring spotlight on problems with the CFP. The long-standing line from Brussels that the policy is effectively non-negotiable was undermined by the suggestion from Commissioner Kadis that if Iceland voted Yes there was “definitely room for flexibility”. It will be interesting to see in period ahead if the Commissioner unwittingly unlocked Pandora’s box.
Caption: Iceland’s Prime Minister Kristrun Frostadottir arrives for a Nordic summer meeting at Hoevelte Barracks, north of Copenhagen, Denmark, 20 August 2026. The meeting gathers heads of government and representatives from the Nordic region, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. EPA/MADS CLAUS RASMUSSEN
Updated: September 10, 2026 - 12:02
