Hungary’s election is not just about Orbán – it could reshape power dynamics across the Balkans

Hungary’s parliamentary elections on 12 April are widely portrayed as a domestic showdown between Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and opposition leader Peter Magyar. In reality, the vote could determine the survival of a political axis that has shaped power relations far beyond Hungary’s borders – from Belgrade and Banja Luka to Skopje. An Orbán defeat would not only redraw the map in Budapest, but could weaken a regional network that has provided political cover, leverage and ideological confidence to like-minded leaders across the Balkans.

As one of the European Union’s longest-serving leaders, Orbán has developed a model of political influence that reaches well beyond Hungary’s borders. His confrontations with EU institutions, his cultivation of ties with hard-right forces across Europe, and his emphasis on national sovereignty have combined into a political template that has found receptive partners in the Balkans.

This has been most evident in his consistently close relationship with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, widely seen in Belgrade as a strategic asset. Hungary under Orbán has often been perceived as sympathetic to Serbia’s positions in European debates, offering Vučić a useful channel within an EU environment where issues such as the rule of law, media freedom, and geopolitical alignment continue to generate friction with Brussels.

If Hungary were to shift course under a more institutionally “normalised” government, as promised by Peter Magyar and his TISZA movement, Budapest’s willingness to invest political capital in defending controversial choices made by Belgrade could diminish. That would not automatically transform Serbia’s EU trajectory, but it could narrow the diplomatic space Vučić has enjoyed thanks to Orbán’s backing.

Vučić joins far-right EU cohort rallying behind Orbán ahead of 12 April Hungarian vote

The implications are equally significant in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in Republika Srpska. Orbán’s relationship with its leader, Milorad Dodik, has not been merely symbolic. At times, Hungary has been presented as one of the few remaining EU-based reference points for Dodik’s political resilience, at a moment when Western governments have become increasingly wary of actions they view as destabilising.

A change in Hungary’s political orientation could deprive Banja Luka of one of its rare allies inside the EU. Such a shift might increase pressure on Republika Srpska to comply more closely with European recommendations and reduce Dodik’s room for manoeuvre within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragile internal balance.

In North Macedonia, the consequences could be more complex, as cooperation with Hungary has also taken on practical dimensions. Recent years have seen close political contacts and government-to-government arrangements underpinned by ideological affinity. Current Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski has operated within this climate of political proximity.

A new leadership in Budapest could introduce a stricter institutional approach, greater emphasis on transparency, and a cooler assessment of arrangements that are currently treated as given. This would likely force the government in Skopje to adjust to an environment in which political affinity alone is no longer sufficient to sustain economic or diplomatic understandings.

At stake, however, is more than a set of bilateral relationships. Orbán has long promoted his governance model as an alternative to what he portrays as the dominant European consensus. Critics, by contrast, describe it as a shift towards a more illiberal version of democracy. An electoral defeat would send a signal that this model is not politically invulnerable – a message that would resonate across the Balkans, where several political forces draw confidence and legitimacy from similar narratives centred on sovereignty and resistance to external pressure.

Such an outcome could also reopen sensitive debates over political asylum and unresolved judicial cases linked to figures from the region who have spent time in Hungary in recent years, most notably former North Macedonian prime minister Nikola Gruevski. A new Hungarian government would face a choice between continuity and a possible re-engagement with governments seeking stronger judicial cooperation. Either path would carry consequences not only for diplomatic relations, but also for internal political dynamics in the Balkans.

Orbán’s decision to grant refuge to Poland’s Ziobro poses serious challenge for the EU

Orbán’s potential defeat, therefore, would represent more than a routine change of government. It would amount to a regional inflection point, with the capacity to affect how Serbia navigates its European path, to alter pressure dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to reshape North Macedonia’s expectations regarding external support.

Conversely, another Orbán victory would consolidate the existing architecture of influence, reinforcing a sense of continuity among his regional allies and sustaining a model of cooperation built on ideological convergence and selective confrontation with Brussels.

Ultimately, what is at stake on 12 April goes well beyond Hungary’s borders. Budapest has functioned as a hub in a network of political relationships influencing both stability and European orientation across Southeast Europe. Should that hub change direction, the network will not disappear – but it will be forced to redefine the terms on which it operates.

The full article in Greek, published by EUalive’s partner IBNA and can be found here.

Caption: A handout photo made available by Hungarian PM’s General Department of Communication shows Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, leader of the Fidesz party, speaking to supporters during an election campaign event in Szentendre, north of Budapest, Hungary, 10 February 2026 (issued 11 February 2026). Hungary will hold parliamentary elections on 12 April 2026.