EditHow Ukraine is almost already “EU-ready” in foreign and defence policy
EU defence integration long remained one of the most politically sensitive areas of European cooperation, but Russia’s aggression has profoundly shifted this logic.
Where is Ukraine on its way toward European Union accession? Across most policy areas, Ukraine’s path toward joining the EU can still be summed up with a sober formula: much remains to be done, and in many sectors only part of the journey has been completed. This applies to heavy industry, agriculture, democratic institutions and governance. In some areas, even the halfway point remains distant.
There is, however, one notable exception.
In the EU accession talks, Cluster 6 – “External Relations”, which includes foreign, security and defence policy, stands out as the area where Ukraine comes closest to being “ready for accession”. According to the European Commission’s latest enlargement report, Ukraine received a rating of “good” (four out of five) for both chapters within this cluster.
Ukraine today is more deeply integrated into the EU’s political dialogue than any other candidate country. Kyiv systematically aligns with EU foreign policy positions open to candidates and participates in virtually all joint political statements. In the security field in particular, cooperation has reached a level where European partners actively seek Ukraine’s inclusion – even in areas where Ukrainian diplomats had expected resistance.
This is especially visible in defence-industrial cooperation. Claims about a lack of trust or political hesitation in Brussels tend to evaporate when the conversation turns to cooperation with Ukraine’s defence sector.
Yet despite these advances, the Commission’s assessment remains cautious. Even here, Ukraine has not reached the top score.
Why “good” is not “excellent”
The Commission’s annual enlargement reports are technical assessments, not political endorsements. Each candidate is evaluated against a uniform set of benchmarks. A “good” rating does not mean that 75% of the work is done, nor does it imply linear progress.
In fact, officials acknowledge that most of the formal tasks under Cluster 6 have already been completed, largely because this cluster contains fewer technical obligations than others. This is precisely why Ukraine wants it opened early in the negotiations, alongside the far more demanding internal market cluster.
Brussels and most member states have already agreed that once Hungary lifts its blockade on opening talks under the “Fundamentals” cluster, Clusters 2 (Internal Market) and 6 should follow immediately. While the internal market chapter will require years of complex alignment, Cluster 6 is seen in Kyiv as an opportunity for fast, visible progress.
(As of December 2025, Hungary continues to single-handedly block the formal opening of Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations — the essential first step under the revised methodology — yet technical screening, bilateral meetings, and reform work proceed intensively on all chapters, allowing the Commission to state that “the process moves forward despite the political hold-up in the Council.”)
Still, a paradox remains.
Under Chapter 30 (External Trade), Ukraine has shown almost no measurable progress for three consecutive years. The reason is structural: Ukraine continues to pursue an independent trade policy, signing bilateral agreements with non-EU partners. Without a concrete perspective for customs union or full accession, Kyiv has little incentive or ability to fully align its trade regime with the EU’s.
By contrast, Chapter 31 (Foreign, Security and Defence Policy) tells a very different story. For three years in a row, the Commission has recorded “good progress”. Yet the overall score stubbornly remains at four out of five – while Montenegro, for instance, has already reached the top mark.
Sanctions and the Rome Statute: unfinished business
Two gaps continue to weigh on Ukraine’s rating.
First, Ukraine has yet to fully synchronise its national sanctions regime with EU sanctions law, as Montenegro has already done. This raises politically sensitive questions at home, as full alignment could force Kyiv to revisit high-profile national sanctions not mirrored at EU level.
Second, Ukraine still needs to complete the implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Earlier legislative attempts stalled, and parliamentary work on the issue has since slowed.
There is, however, one clear success: Ukraine now aligns with 99% of EU foreign policy statements, according to Commission data – only marginally behind Montenegro’s full alignment.
Defence cooperation accelerates
Where Ukraine’s performance is most striking is in the rapidly expanding EU defence initiatives.
This year, EU member states approved the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) initiative, worth €150 billion in defence industry loans. While participation by Ukraine is optional for member states, Kyiv’s inclusion has exceeded expectations.
In October, Ukrainian officials were aware of only two EU partners planning to include Ukraine in their national SAFE projects. By late autumn, 15 out of 19 participating states had signalled support for involving Ukraine, according to officials involved in the process. The exact volume of financing for Ukrainian firms will become clearer in early 2026.
Parallel to this, the EU has launched the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP) worth €1.5 billion, with €300 million earmarked specifically for Ukrainian participants. Access, however, will depend on Kyiv aligning its defence procurement rules and innovation governance with EU standards – legislative work that has already begun.
Importantly, these are not abstract political declarations. They rely on deep bureaucratic cooperation, shared technical standards and mutual administrative trust.
Trust built in wartime
EU defence integration long remained one of the most politically sensitive areas of European cooperation, guarded by national sovereignty concerns. Russia’s war against Ukraine has profoundly shifted this logic.
A growing number of EU capitals now openly acknowledge that Europe’s future security architecture is inconceivable without Ukraine. Ukrainian battle-tested capabilities are increasingly viewed as a core strategic asset.
At the same time, U.S. political uncertainty has further strengthened this perception. The possibility of reduced American engagement in European security has elevated Ukraine’s role even further in EU strategic thinking.
However, officials caution that this momentum depends on one crucial factor: a sustainable ceasefire. Without it, support may persist, but genuine integration would be far harder to achieve.
Trust, too, must remain mutual. Recent closed sociological research presented during expert discussions shows that over 70% of Ukrainians continue to trust the EU, a figure that has even increased over the past year – while trust in the United States has sharply declined.
For now, Ukraine and the EU continue to build their security partnership in practice – even before formal negotiations on Cluster 6 officially begin.
The original article in Ukrainian, published by EUalive’s partner European Pravda can be found here.
Caption: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky attends the Euro Summit in Brussels, Belgium, 23 October 2025. EPA/Yves Herman / POOL
Updated: December 9, 2025 - 17:05
