How Pashinyan “humiliated” Putin

Although Pashinyan can “defeat” Putin rhetorically, in practical terms Russia still has mechanisms to shape Armenia’s foreign policy direction, at least to some extent, writes Nikola Mikovic.

Nikola Mikovic is a political analyst and journalist with a proven track record of accurate predictions on high-stakes conflicts, who shares timely analysis on X @nikola_mikovic

Russia is struggling to preserve its influence in Armenia, a country that has traditionally been in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit but is now shifting toward the West. The upcoming parliamentary elections in the South Caucasus nation, scheduled for 7 June, could mark a decisive turning point in Yerevan’s geopolitical direction. But will the Kremlin, by meddling in the vote, succeed in reasserting its position?

Ever since Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan came to power in 2018, Russia began to gradually lose its grip in the former Soviet republic. Fully aware that things in Armenia will not be the same as they were under allegedly pro-Russian Serzh Sargsyan, the Kremlin started to indirectly accuse Pashinyan and his close allies of having close ties with American billionaire George Soros.

However, relations between Moscow and Yerevan remained largely stable until 2020, when Armenia suffered a defeat in a war against Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Pashinyan has repeatedly blamed the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for failing to protect Armenia, the military bloc’s founding member. Finally, in 2024, the country effectively froze its participation in the CSTO.

“We are not participating in CSTO activities because we are unable to explain to our citizens why the organization did not respond, despite its obligations,” Pashinyan told Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 1 April.

Previously, Putin tried to justify the CSTO’s ambivalence regarding Armenia by claiming that Yerevan had recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan in Prague in 2022, which is why, in his view, “it simply became wholly inappropriate for the CSTO to become involved in a process that had taken on an intra-Azerbaijani dimension.” Armenia, however, expected CSTO support not in 2022, but in 2020 when the war broke out.

Putin, therefore, used misleading statements to explain what is often seen as Russia’s betrayal of Armenia. Such a tactic did not appear to work. In front of cameras, the Armenian Prime Minister openly opposed the Russian leader on nearly every issue.

While Putin claimed that Armenia – being part of the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – cannot simultaneously seek to join the European Union, Pashinyan stressed that he would continue doing so “as long as it is possible.” He also told Putin openly that Armenia, although discussing the construction of a new nuclear power plant with Moscow, is also exploring the matter with “other partners.”

Indeed, on 10 February, Armenia signed a major civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, with Vice President JD Vance pledging up to $9 billion for the development of American small modular reactors in the former Soviet republic. Previously, in August 2025, Armenia held joint military drills with the United States while refusing to participate in any CSTO activities.

At the same time, Yerevan seeks to normalize relations with its former archenemies – Azerbaijan and Turkey. While in the past it was Russia that acted as a regional arbiter, as of August 2025 that function belongs to the United States. Washington is now encouraging Yerevan to develop closer ties not only with the West, but also with Baku and Ankara.

It is, therefore, no surprise that Armenia has begun importing fuel from Azerbaijan and is seeking to modernize railway infrastructure connecting the country with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. The problem, however, is that Russia maintains effective control over Armenia’s rail system, as under a 2008 agreement the Armenian government granted the state-owned company Russian Railways (RZD) a 30-year management contract, with an option to extend it for another 10 years.

In an attempt to reduce Russian presence in the country, Pashinyan proposed transferring management of Armenia’s railway network to a third party acceptable to both Armenia and Russia. If the Kremlin, under any pretext, accepts his proposal, Russia will effectively lose one of its final trump cards in Armenia.

However, Putin’s remark that “there are many pro-Russian political forces in Armenia” suggests that Moscow will attempt to preserve at least remnants of its influence in the South Caucasus. But that will be easier said than done, especially given that, during the talks with Pashinyan, Putin demonstrated weakness on several occasions. By asking the Armenian Prime Minister to allow pro-Russian political parties in Armenia to participate in the nation’s political life, he has clearly shown that Russia has already lost much of its sway in the landlocked country of around three million people.

Pashinyan, on the other hand, used the talks as part of his election campaign, demonstrating to voters that he could “humiliate” Putin right in the heart of the Kremlin. Still, this was not particularly difficult to achieve, given that Putin, unlike Pashinyan, is not a politician in the classical sense of the term.

Before coming to power, the Russian leader served as a KGB apparatchik. He has never run a political party, nor has he participated in public debates or in Russian political life in general. Unlike him, Pashinyan was an opposition leader and has a history of debating his opponents, a practice he continues to this day.

But although he can “defeat” Putin rhetorically, in practical terms Russia still has mechanisms to shape Armenia’s foreign policy direction, at least to some extent. However, given that the European Union seems determined to continue funding Armenia’s capacity to “detect, analyze, and respond to foreign interference” ahead of the upcoming vote, the Kremlin will have a hard time preserving the status quo in the South Caucasus nation.

Caption: Russian President Vladimir Putin (C) and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, (L) attend a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, 1 April 2026. EPA/PAVEL BEDNYAKOV/AP POOL