How Hungary collaborated with Russia to remove oligarchs, companies, and banks from the EU sanctions list

This article was produced as part of The Eastern Frontier Initiative (TEFI), a collaboration between independent publishers from Central and Eastern Europe focused on European security and democracy.

The authors are: Wojciech Cieśla (FRONTSTORY), Anna Gielewska (FRONTSTORY), Szabolcs Panyi (VSquare), Holger Roonemaa (Delfi Estonia), Ilya Ber (Delfi Estonia), Michael Weiss (The Insider), Lukas Diko (ICJK)

A series of evidence shows how the Hungarian foreign minister acted on behalf of the Kremlin, making efforts to remove targeted Russians from the sanctions list, including Alisher Usmanov’s sister.

In another conversation with the Russian deputy energy minister, Szijjártó speaks about doing everything possible to repeal an EU sanctions package and offers to try to save Russian entities from sanctions.

According to Szijjártó, the Slovak government is also contributing to the coordinated Russo-Hungarian efforts.

“I’m calling because Alisher asked me to”

Just one hour after Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó arrived in Budapest from Saint Petersburg on 30 August 2024, he received a phone call from his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. Lavrov told him that Szijjártó had been quoted everywhere in the Russian press following his visit.

“Did I say something wrong?” Szijjártó asked nervously.

“No, no, no. They were just saying that you are fighting pragmatically for your country’s interests.”

The reason for Lavrov’s call was a request: Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov wanted his sister, Gulbahor Ismailova, removed from the EU sanctions list, and Szijjártó had promised to help. Usmanov, a Russo-Uzbek magnate, built his fortune in mining, industry, telecommunications, and media. He has been described as one of Putin’s favourite businessmen, with “particularly close ties” to the Russian president.

“Look, I’m calling because Alisher asked me to and just wanted me to remind you that you were taking care of his sister,” Lavrov said.

“Yes, absolutely,” Szijjártó replied. “The situation is as follows: together with the Slovaks, we are submitting a proposal to the European Union to remove her from the list. We will submit it next week and, once the new review period begins, it will be put on the agenda and we will do everything possible to have her removed.”

Lavrov expressed satisfaction and appreciation for “your support and your fight for equality in all areas.”

After the main purpose of the conversation was achieved, Lavrov and Szijjártó expressed their shared disdain for the European Union, especially for pro-Ukrainian countries.

Both criticised Josep Borrell, then the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, whom Lavrov called “the biggest disappointment,” while Szijjártó contemptuously described him as “the European Biden.”

Before ending the call, the Hungarian minister spoke admiringly about the new Gazprom headquarters he had visited in Russia, adding: “I am always at your disposal.”

Seven months later, Ismailova was removed from the EU sanctions list.

Hungary’s Kim Philby

The phone call between the two foreign ministers – one of many held between 2023 and 2025 – highlights a close relationship between Szijjártó, who represents an EU and NATO member state, and Lavrov, who represents a country that has invaded and occupied a European state and is waging a hybrid war against NATO’s eastern flank.

The conversations contain sensitive information about internal deliberations in Budapest and Brussels, which are of obvious interest to the Kremlin. They also provide clear evidence that Russia is behind Hungary’s and Slovakia’s efforts to block EU sanctions against Russian individuals or entities.

In his exchanges with Lavrov, Szijjártó comes across as respectful, almost servile. “If you remove the names and show these conversations to any case officer, he will swear it is the recording of an intelligence officer working his agent,” said a senior European intelligence official after analysing the transcripts.

The transcripts and audio recordings of the Lavrov–Szijjártó conversations, as well as Szijjártó’s calls with other Russian government officials, were obtained and verified by a consortium of investigative newsrooms including VSquare, FRONTSTORY, Delfi Estonia, The Insider, and the Ján Kuciak Investigative Centre (ICJK).

Szijjártó’s apparent willingness, as a high-ranking Hungarian government official, to act discreetly in Russia’s interest at EU level may explain why Moscow is investing considerable effort in keeping Viktor Orbán and his pro-Kremlin Fidesz party in power.

In the same call on 30 August 2024, immediately after discussing Gulbahor Ismailova’s removal from the sanctions list, Szijjártó also revealed details of the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting he had attended the day before.

He told Lavrov about Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis’s statement that Hungary and Slovakia were contributing 12% to every rocket and projectile by buying Russian gas and oil. Szijjártó said he had rebutted Landsbergis by arguing that all Europeans were indirectly buying Russian energy through India and Kazakhstan.

Landsbergis later confirmed the exchange was real and commented: “It seems that all this time Putin has had – and still has – a mole in all official European and NATO meetings. If the integrity of these meetings is to be maintained, it would be appropriate to exclude Hungary from all of them. Every generation has its Kim Philby. It seems that Péter Szijjártó is playing this role with enthusiasm.”

Szijjártó received the Order of Friendship – Russia’s highest honour for foreigners – from Vladimir Putin, handed to him personally by Lavrov in December 2021.

Removing names

Szijjártó’s efforts regarding Usmanov’s sister were not isolated. Ismailova was removed from the list together with Russian businessman Viatcheslav Moshe Kantor and Russian Sports Minister Mikhail Degtyarev. This happened after Hungary and Slovakia threatened to block the six-month extension of EU sanctions in March 2025.

A European diplomat involved in the sanctions negotiations said: “Hungary is clearly carrying out political orders from Russia.”

The EU must renew sanctions by consensus every six months, giving Hungary disproportionate leverage. Hungary and Slovakia typically start negotiations with a long list of names they want removed for “political reasons,” then narrow it down to two or three.

In February 2026, Hungary vetoed the entire 20th sanctions package – the first time it went this far – citing issues with oil flows through the Druzhba pipeline.

Additional efforts and context

The article details further cases, including repeated protection of Patriarch Kirill, attempts to remove other oligarchs (such as Fridman), and coordinated actions with Slovakia under Robert Fico.

Hungary also worked to protect companies and banks linked to the Russian state. In one recorded conversation with a Russian deputy energy minister, Szijjártó promised to do everything possible to repeal an upcoming EU sanctions package and offered to help save specific Russian entities.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also intervened in support of Usmanov, sending a letter to Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico praising the oligarch.

The investigation concludes that these actions represent systematic collaboration between the Orbán government and the Kremlin, undermining EU unity on sanctions against Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The full article in Romanian published by our partner PressOne.ro can be found here.

Illustration: Linda Vainomäe / Delfi Estonia