EditHow covert Saudi and UAE strikes reveal a new chapter in the 2026 Iran war
What began as an American-Israeli operation has quietly drawn in the Gulf monarchies, long Iran’s most bitter regional rivals
As the fragile ceasefire in the 2026 Iran war limps along – brokered by Pakistan in early April after five weeks of direct U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian targets – new reporting is peeling back layers of a previously hidden front.
What began as an American-Israeli operation has quietly drawn in the Gulf monarchies, long Iran’s most bitter regional rivals. First came revelations about the United Arab Emirates in a Wall Street Journal investigation published on 11 May. Then, on 12 May, a Reuters exclusive detailed Saudi Arabia’s own unpublicized strikes on Iranian soil. Together, these snippets paint a coherent picture: Gulf states are no longer content to absorb Iranian retaliation or rely solely on U.S. protection. They have crossed a historic threshold into direct, albeit covert, military action.
The broader war context
The conflict escalated dramatically on 28 February when the United States and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes on Iranian military and nuclear sites. Tehran responded with a barrage of missiles, drones, and cruise missiles aimed not only at Israel and U.S. bases but disproportionately at Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Iranian attacks on the Emirates alone numbered in the thousands, damaging oil and gas infrastructure (including the Habshan plant), disrupting aviation and tourism, and killing civilians. Saudi facilities and cities were also hit, wounding U.S. troops stationed there and threatening energy exports.
For decades, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had treated Iran as an existential threat – funding proxies in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq; competing for influence in the region; and viewing Tehran’s nuclear program and control over the Strait of Hormuz as direct dangers to their survival and economic models. The 2023 China-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement had offered a brief diplomatic thaw, but the 2026 war shattered that fragile détente. When Iran turned its arsenal on the Gulf in retaliation, the monarchies faced a stark choice: absorb the blows or hit back.
UAE’s covert retaliation: crossing the red line
According to the Wall Street Journal, the UAE conducted secret military strikes inside Iran, most notably hitting a key oil refinery on Lavan Island in the Persian Gulf in early April – precisely around the time President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire. The strikes reportedly involved Emirati Mirage 2000 fighter jets and were launched in direct response to the barrage of more than 2,800 Iranian missiles and drones that had targeted the UAE. U.S. officials quietly welcomed Abu Dhabi’s involvement, viewing it as a useful supplement to American and Israeli pressure.
The UAE has not publicly confirmed the operations, but its foreign ministry has repeatedly asserted its “sovereign right” to respond militarily to hostile acts. The timing – during a declared ceasefire – suggests calculated risk-taking: enough to punish Iran and protect economic interests, but deniable enough to avoid derailing fragile talks. This marks the first known instance of any Gulf Arab state launching direct strikes on Iranian territory, shattering a long-standing taboo.
Saudi Arabia joins the shadow war
One day after the UAE story broke, Reuters revealed that Saudi Arabia had conducted “numerous” covert strikes on Iran throughout the wider Middle East war. Two Western officials and two Iranian sources confirmed the operations, which were launched in retaliation for Iranian attacks on Saudi bases, oil facilities, and cities. This is the first time Riyadh is known to have struck Iranian soil directly – another red line crossed.
Unlike the UAE’s more concentrated refinery strike, Saudi actions appear to have been broader and sustained. Some reporting indicates Riyadh even gave Iran advance notice through backchannels, a move that may have helped contain escalation and facilitated later de-escalation talks. The kingdom’s growing boldness reflects years of frustration with Iranian proxy warfare (especially in Yemen) and a strategic calculation that passive defence is no longer sufficient when the homeland itself is under fire.
A pattern of assertive self-defence
These revelations are not isolated leaks – they form a pattern of Gulf states moving from indirect pressure (sanctions, financial crackdowns on Iranian networks, diplomatic isolation) to kinetic, deniable action. Several drivers stand out:
- Self-preservation over ideology: both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have spent billions projecting stability and economic diversification (Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia; the UAE’s global hub ambitions). Iranian strikes exposed their vulnerabilities, damaging investor confidence and raising risk premiums. Covert retaliation restores deterrence without the full political cost of open war.
- Alignment with, but independence from, Washington: the Trump administration’s campaign provided cover and quiet encouragement, yet Gulf states acted on their own timeline and targets. This reflects a maturing strategic autonomy – Gulf capitals are no longer mere junior partners.
- Deniability as strategy: by keeping operations covert and maintaining some diplomatic channels (Saudi Arabia did not close its Tehran embassy; the UAE has kept limited lines open), both countries preserve room for future deals while signalling resolve. The backchannel element also hints at a desire to avoid total rupture.
- Divergent GCC dynamics: the UAE has emerged as the more hawkish actor – closing its embassy in Tehran, expelling Iranian-linked networks, and striking directly. Saudi Arabia appears slightly more calibrated, balancing retaliation with de-escalation. Oman and Qatar, by contrast, have leaned toward diplomacy, highlighting fractures within the GCC.
French connection?
The strong strategic partnerships with France – especially the UAE’s permanent French military base, mutual defence agreements, Rafale fighter jet acquisitions, joint training, and intelligence sharing – provide Abu Dhabi and Riyadh with enhanced military capabilities, diplomatic cover, and a reliable Western backstop that bolsters their confidence to act more assertively. In the Iran conflict, French Rafales have actively helped defend UAE airspace, and Paris has repeatedly condemned Iranian strikes while pledging defensive support, giving the Gulf states greater freedom to conduct covert retaliatory operations without fearing total isolation. This European “insurance policy” diversifies their reliance beyond the United States and signals to adversaries that they enjoy multifaceted great-power backing.
However, this does not equate to a blank check for offensive liberty. France’s support remains primarily defensive and cautious; there is no public evidence it greenlit or directly enabled the UAE’s refinery strike on Lavan Island or Saudi Arabia’s covert operations. The real drivers of Gulf assertiveness are their own growing military sophistication, economic stakes, and direct exposure to Iranian retaliation.
Implications for the region
These disclosures complicate the already shaky ceasefire. Iran has accused the UAE of violating the truce and has vowed crushing responses to any further Gulf aggression. At the same time, the revelations may strengthen Gulf leverage in future negotiations: Tehran now knows its neighbors are willing to strike back, potentially deterring renewed proxy or missile campaigns.
Longer term, the 2026 war has accelerated a shift in Gulf security doctrine. Decades of reliance on U.S. protection are giving way to proactive self-defence, even at the risk of direct confrontation. The “snippets” we are seeing now – UAE refinery strike, Saudi multiple operations – suggest the full story of Gulf involvement may still be emerging.
Caption: A handout photo made available by the UAE Presidential Court shows a general view of the Port of Fujairah during a tour by President of the United Arab Emirates and Ruler of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (not pictured) and Sheikh Hamad bin Mohamed Al Sharqi (not pictured), Supreme Council Member and Ruler of Fujairah, at the Port of Fujairah in Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, 17 April 2026. EPA/THE UAE PRESIDENTIAL COURT /HANDOUT
Updated: May 13, 2026 - 15:48
