Herman Galushchenko: the minister at the centre of Ukraine’s biggest wartime graft scandal

Herman Galushchenko, Ukraine’s former Energy Minister, is now inextricably linked to one of the largest corruption scandals uncovered during Russia’s full-scale invasion. EUalive’s partner Suspilne interviewed more than a dozen current and former energy sector officials and insiders. None were surprised by the allegations of corruption at state-owned nuclear giant Energoatom, Ukraine’s largest electricity producer.

In the NABU investigation codenamed “Operation Midas,” prosecutors allege that Galushchenko “facilitated Timur Mindich’s control over financial flows in the energy sector.”

Mindich, a co-owner of the Kvartal-95 studio closely associated with President Zelenskyy, is the central figure in the case.

Multiple journalistic investigations had exposed questionable schemes there during Galushchenko’s tenure as Energoatom vice-president (2020–2021) and later as Minister (2021–2025). What did surprise many sources was Galushchenko’s meteoric rise despite lacking any prior experience managing energy companies.

A loyal fixer

Galushchenko began his career as a prosecutor in Lviv, then moved to Kyiv in the late 1990s, spending 13 years in the Presidential Administration under Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko. Former colleagues describe him as a skilled, ambitious lawyer who “could solve any bureaucratic issue” and displayed “uncompromising devotion to management.”

In 2009–2010 he rarely appeared at work, focusing instead on private business. Rather than face dismissal, he negotiated a quiet exit in exchange for a state award—the Order of Danylo Halytsky—from President Yushchenko. Under Yanukovych he worked at the Justice Ministry under Oleksandr Lavrynovych (later charged with treason for the Kharkiv Agreements).

Entry into the nuclear sector and ties to Andriy Derkach

In 2013 Galushchenko joined Energoatom as executive director for legal affairs under a management team close to Andriy Derkach—former Energoatom president (2006–2007), pro-Russian MP, and now a sanctioned Russian agent stripped of Ukrainian citizenship. Multiple sources claim Derkach’s circle facilitated Galushchenko’s appointments, despite his public denials of any connection.

After the 2014 Revolution, several Derkach-linked managers fled to Russia, including Mykyta Konstantinov, now deputy director at Rosatom’s nuclear operator. Galushchenko remained, later returning in 2020 as vice-president—again, sources say, with Derkach’s backing.

During 2020–2021 Energoatom saw a resurgence of old schemes:

Electricity sold below market price to Ihor Kolomoisky-linked United Energy, costing the state nearly 100 million UAH (NABU estimate).
A rushed, violation-riddled contract—personally signed by vice-president Galushchenko—for a spent nuclear fuel storage facility in Chernobyl. NABU later charged contractors with embezzling nearly 100 million UAH from that project.

Appointment as minister

In April 2021, amid a prolonged crisis at the Energy Ministry, Galushchenko was unexpectedly nominated. He was interviewed at the President’s Office by Zelensky’s then-first aide Serhiy Shefir and received 305 votes in parliament, including from pro-Russian OPZZH deputies. Some Servant of the People MPs privately called him a “flexible manager” with whom “issues could be solved the old way.”

Expanding control

As minister, Galushchenko is accused of systematically subordinating independent state energy companies:

Removed nuclear regulator chief Hryhoriy Plachkov in 2021 after he refused to approve questionable projects, including completion of Khmelnytskyi NPP units and the Chernobyl storage facility.
Attempted (unsuccessfully) to replace the independent head of the Gas Transmission System Operator.
Transferred grid operator Ukrenergo from Finance Ministry oversight to Energy Ministry control, later engineering the 2024 dismissal of CEO Volodymyr Kudrytsky amid intense pressure that independent supervisory board members called political.

The Khmelnytskyi obsession and kickback allegations

Galushchenko’s flagship project was completing two unfinished reactors (Units 3 and 4) at Khmelnytskyi NPP, started in the 1980s but halted after the Chernobyl disaster. He aggressively promoted a hybrid approach: building the units with modern American Westinghouse AP1000 technology for enhanced safety and efficiency, while using a cheaper, interim solution of purchasing two unused Soviet-era VVER-1000 reactor pressure vessels (the core containment structures) from Bulgaria to jumpstart construction.

These vessels originated from Bulgaria’s abandoned Belene NPP project, where Russia’s Rosatom had manufactured them in the 2000s before the site was shelved in 2012 due to cost overruns. Stored for over a decade, they were obsolete by modern standards—critics like Greenpeace Ukraine called them “old junk” incompatible with EU decarbonization goals and risky for safety. The deal was valued at around €600 million ($622 million), covering the vessels and related equipment, with the full completion estimated at €10 billion or more.

Parliament initially resisted, fearing corruption at Energoatom amid ongoing scandals. NABU wiretaps later captured suspects discussing 10–15% kickbacks on related protective structures—potentially siphoning billions of UAH from the massive project. To overcome hesitation, Zelensky publicly endorsed the initiative in early 2025, urging MPs to vote.

On 11 February 2025, Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada passed Bill No. 11392, authorizing Energoatom to buy the Bulgarian vessels. Zelensky signed it into law on March 13, 2025.

Bulgaria’s government had already approved negotiations, aiming to recoup its investment.However, just months later, Bulgaria’s new parliament—elected in spring 2025—reversed course. On 20 June 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Atanas Zafirov announced Bulgaria would not proceed with the sale, citing domestic political opposition and renewed debates over selling Russian-linked assets during wartime.

Despite this, Galushchenko insisted the “issue is not closed,” hinting at ongoing diplomatic efforts. As of November 2025, no deal has materialised.

Operation Midas and the end

In 2025 recordings, Mindich allegedly coached Galushchenko on how to speak with President Zelenskyy: “Tell him: ‘I’ll do anything you say, anything you need—I’m yours.’” Prosecutors claim Galushchenko’s advisor Ihor Myronyuk (“Rocket”) effectively ran the ministry and coordinated the kickback scheme.

When Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko formed a new government in July 2025, sources say she wanted Galushchenko gone from Energy. He was instead offered the Justice Ministry portfolio; his former deputy (and, per NABU, romantic partner) Svitlana Grinchuk took over Energy.

Both Galushchenko and Grinchuk deny any wrongdoing. Galushchenko has ignored repeated requests for comment from Suspilne and stated only that he will “defend himself legally.”

Despite the absence of total blackouts during his tenure – an achievement often credited to Western aid and company-level resilience rather than ministerial leadership – Galushchenko leaves office shadowed by allegations that Ukraine’s critical nuclear sector became a cash machine for a narrow circle during the country’s existential war.

A longer version of the journalistic investigation by Suspilne can be found here.

Caption: A handout photo made available by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi (R) standing next to Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Galushchenko during a visit to the Kyivska substation, near Kyiv, Ukraine, 4 February 2025. EPA/IAEA/DIEGO CANDANO LARIS HANDOUT