Hard times for Vučić

By the end of 2025, Serbia is facing a cooling of relations with nearly all of its key foreign policy partners – the EU, the United States, and Russia – pointing to a significant loss of international credibility for the regime led by President Aleksandar Vučić. Of the four proclaimed “pillars” of Serbian foreign policy (Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and Beijing), the only one with which Vučić has not worsened ties in recent weeks is China.

A cold shower from the United States

Although many Serbs – including Vučić himself – rejoiced at Donald Trump’s election victory a year ago, the situation has since changed dramatically. A series of actions by the Trump administration indicate that Vučić’s efforts to win favor at any cost have proven fruitless. These include imposing customs tariffs of up to 35% on certain Serbian imports (among the highest in Europe after Switzerland); eventually enforcing sanctions on the oil company Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) due to its majority Russian ownership; and, last week, banning imports of car tires from Serbia over allegations of forced labor at the Chinese-owned Linglong factory in Zrenjanin.

In addition, Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, recently abandoned plans for a luxury real estate project in downtown Belgrade – a development through which Vučić had hoped to cultivate closer ties with U.S. political and business circles.

The sharpest rebuke came last week when President Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which includes strong criticism of conditions in Serbia – the only Western Balkan country explicitly singled out. This bipartisan law, tougher than recent European Parliament resolutions or Commission reports, expresses concern over the state of democracy, unfair election conditions, and threats by state officials against peaceful demonstrators, opposition figures, and civil society. It also addresses corruption among key political leaders in the region (without naming Serbia directly) and opens the door to targeted sanctions against officials involved in corrupt deals or manipulation.

As a binding law overseen by Congress – not a mere strategy or regulation that Trump could ignore – the NDAA sends a clear signal that the U.S. increasingly views Serbia as a country with serious deficits in democracy, elections, and the rule of law. This represents highly unfavorable news for Vučić, suggesting that the Trump administration is now “collecting on past blunders,” from questionable donations to U.S. political causes to awkward attempts at proximity. Serbia, and Vučić personally, now faces potential parallel pressure on democracy, Kosovo resolution, and high-level corruption.

Sobering messages from EU officials

The situation is no better regarding Vučić’s relations with the European Union.

For four years, Serbia has failed to open Cluster 3 (Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth) in EU accession talks, leading Vučić to boycott last week’s EU-Western Balkans Summit – the first such absence in 14 years. His non-attendance was intended as a protest against the EU’s unwillingness to offer even symbolic progress and perhaps a warning of potential regional disruption. However, with little leverage in the current geopolitical landscape, the move achieved nothing beyond reinforcing perceptions of Serbia drifting further from the EU.

The EU General Affairs Council reiterated that further progress on the rule of law and normalization of relations with Kosovo will determine the pace of talks, deferring cluster openings indefinitely. While Serbian officials blame a lack of EU political will, the true obstacles lie in domestic shortcomings: persistent issues with rule of law and media freedom, refusal to impose sanctions on Russia, and stalled Kosovo dialogue.

A major blow came when Germany – under new Chancellor Friedrich Merz – joined countries like Croatia, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and the Baltics in opposing Cluster 3’s opening, marking a notable cooling from Berlin’s previous support.

Days before the summit, Vučić met in Brussels with Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa, whose reception of his proposal for simultaneous Western Balkans accession was lukewarm at best – an idea widely seen as an attempt to slow the progress of Montenegro and Albania, preserving Serbia’s claimed regional leadership.

The identical posts by von der Leyen and Costa on X after the meeting, when decoded from Brussels diplomatic language, conveyed that little has changed, that Belgrade underestimates the importance of reliability amid European geopolitical tensions, and that it is overdue for Serbia to sever energy ties with Russia. Their emphasis on remaining “fully committed to seeing a democratic Serbia in the EU” subtly implies that the current regime no longer fully qualifies as democratic and that further EU progress requires genuine democratic reform.

A warning from Moscow

Even relations with Russia have soured. Last week, President Vladimir Putin issued an unexpected public warning to Vučić when asked about NIS. Putin noted ongoing dialogue with “friends in Serbia” but stressed that Moscow expects Belgrade to honour the 2008 interstate agreement, warning that failure to do so would undermine investment security guarantees.

Rather than the support Vučić might have anticipated, this was a clear signal of consequences if Russian interests are threatened. With Vučić having set a 15 January deadline for Russians to find a NIS buyer, Putin’s reference to the agreement likely ruled out nationalization while hinting at compensation demands exceeding €3.5 billion – far above Serbian expectations. Despite acknowledging friendly ties, Putin’s tone suggested cynicism and distrust, particularly regarding Serbia’s longstanding use of Russian energy leverage.

The deterioration appears linked in part to reports of large Serbian ammunition shipments reaching Ukraine via intermediaries. Further evidence of strain includes the suspicious 17 November death of Radomir Kurtić, representative of state-owned defence firm Jugoimport–SDPR, in Moscow. Documents and hard drives subsequently vanished from the company’s office there, and Russia has not shared forensic reports with Serbia – unusual for ostensibly friendly nations. Belgrade only learned of the death a month later, prompting speculation of a political warning or fallout from arms trade disputes.

All these developments indicate that Serbia’s international position is weakening and that the “four pillars” doctrine is becoming unsustainable amid rising geopolitical tensions and bloc divisions. The strategy of balancing multiple partners risks simultaneous alienation and erodes Serbia’s credibility as a reliable actor. While Vučić’s room for manoeuvre is shrinking, it remains uncertain whether this external loss of legitimacy will translate into domestic regime change – absent active great-power intervention or a cohesive opposition alternative.

Caption: Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic attends a joint press conference with the European Commission president following their meeting in Belgrade, Serbia, 15 October 2025. Von der Leyen is in Serbia as part of her tour of Western Balkan countries. EPA/ANDREJ CUKIC