Georgia’s stalled EU journey leaves Armenia as a “hole in the map”

The geopolitical dynamics of the South Caucasus are undergoing profound transformation, as Armenia pursues deeper integration with the European Union amid strained ties with traditional ally Russia.

Granted candidate status in December 2023, Georgia was expected to advance to unlock accession negotiations. However, under the ruling Georgian Dream party, the country has instead experienced sharp democratic backsliding. In striking contrast, neighbouring Armenia- long outside the formal EU enlargement race – has suddenly accelerated its pursuit of closer ties and potential membership.

In a recent address to the European Parliament on 11 March Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan underscored this strategic shift, declaring Armenia’s readiness to align as closely as possible with EU standards and values. He emphasized that the country’s path forward hinges on sustained reforms in governance, the judiciary, the economy, and anti-corruption efforts, criteria no aspiring member can bypass.

Pashinyan acknowledged the political nature of EU enlargement decisions, stating that even if full membership is not immediately granted, Armenia would still emerge stronger as a nation fully compliant with European norms.

Geographic realities

Central to Pashinyan’s message was the stark reality that Georgia remains Armenia’s essential gateway to Europe – both geographically, as the two nations share a direct border, and strategically, as a fellow Caucasus state on the EU’s eastern flank. He described the current frozen state of political dialogue between the EU and Georgia as the single biggest obstacle confronting Armenia’s integration efforts today. Without a constructive resumption of EU-Georgia relations, Armenia risks isolation, akin to a “hole in the map” disconnected from broader European progress.

Pashinyan called explicitly for renewed dialogue, noting that such developments hold equal importance for both countries. He highlighted Georgia’s practical contributions to regional stability, including facilitation of the Georgia-Azerbaijan railway, which Armenia plans to leverage for exports. He expressed optimism that Azerbaijan (not a EU hopeful) could soon become a direct export destination, building on existing petroleum imports that have already reduced domestic prices and dismantled longstanding monopolies.

Georgia’s EU trajectory has deteriorated sharply since candidate status was granted in late 2023. Democratic backsliding, including repressive laws targeting civil society, media, and opposition figures, along with disputed elections and restrictions on fundamental freedoms, prompted the EU to de facto halt accession negotiations. In late 2024, Georgia’s government announced a suspension of the process until the end of 2028, a move the EU has condemned as jeopardizing the country’s path. Measures such as suspending visa-free travel for Georgian officials and warnings of further sanctions underscore Brussels’ firm stance: without reversal of these trends and tangible reforms, Georgia cannot advance toward membership.

Russia’s influence in Georgia remains profound and multifaceted, posing a persistent challenge to the country’s sovereignty and its aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration. Beyond the direct occupation of Georgian provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow exerts substantial political, economic, and military pressure. It sustains the separatist governments through financial aid, security guarantees, and infrastructure integration, while frequently advancing the administrative boundary lines (often called “borderization”) deeper into undisputed Georgian territory via fencing, checkpoints, and detentions. This creeping annexation tactic restricts movement, disrupts local economies, and heightens tensions along the lines of contact.

Russia’s leverage extends into Georgia’s domestic politics, particularly through its close alignment with the ruling Georgian Dream party. Since Georgian Dream came to power in 2012 – founded by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who has longstanding business ties to Russia, the government has increasingly adopted policies and rhetoric that echo Kremlin narratives. This includes refraining from joining Western sanctions against Russia after 2022, deepening economic dependencies (such as increased trade, energy imports, and remittances), and suspending EU accession talks in late 2024 amid democratic backsliding. Critics, including Western analysts and opposition figures, describe Georgian Dream as effectively acting in ways that advance Russian interests, with some officials facing sanctions for alleged ties to Russian intelligence or influence operations.

Moscow bolsters this influence through sophisticated disinformation campaigns and support for pro-Russian actors. Kremlin-linked media, troll networks, and aligned Georgian outlets propagate anti-Western narratives, portraying EU and NATO integration as existential threats to Georgian sovereignty, traditional values, and stability.

Armenia’s strategic reorientation away from Russia

Armenia’s pivot toward the West intensified after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and escalated in 2023-2024, when Russia failed to fulfill its security commitments under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) during Azerbaijani advances. Despite obligations to protect Armenia’s territorial integrity, Moscow provided minimal support, even declining to adopt a resolution against Azerbaijan and offering only a fact-finding mission. This perceived abandonment fueled widespread anti-Russian sentiment and prompted Yerevan to freeze CSTO participation, halt contributions, and seek alternative partners.

By 2026, Armenia’s military procurement has diversified dramatically: imports from Russia, once over 90%, now fall below 10%, with major suppliers including France, India, and the Czech Republic. Joint exercises with U.S. forces have become routine, signaling a clear diversification of security ties. While formal CSTO withdrawal has not occurred, officials describe the relationship as “de facto” over, with Russia reaffirming Armenia’s membership status but acknowledging reduced cooperation.

Economically, ties with Russia persist – bilateral trade remains substantial, and remittances from Armenians working there support many families – but political relations have cooled. Moscow has issued warnings about consequences, though it has avoided severe measures like gas price hikes, possibly due to its focus on Ukraine and Armenia’s continued role as a market.

Brussels has responded positively to Armenia’s reforms, pledging support through initiatives like the Resilience and Growth Plan, including significant financial installments. The EU stresses that accession requires profound changes, but welcomes Yerevan’s trajectory. In contrast, the bloc maintains pressure on Georgia to restore democratic standards, end impunity for abuses, and release arbitrarily detained individuals.

As Armenia approaches its June parliamentary elections, the coming months will test the sustainability of this European orientation. Pashinyan’s appeal highlights what should be a shared Caucasian interest in European integration, where progress for one neighbor can uplift all.

Sources: Netgazeti.ge, Georgia Today, Armenia News

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Caption: European Parliament President Roberta Metsola (R) welcomes Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan (L) at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, 11 March 2026. The current plenary session runs from 09 to 12 March 2026. EPA/RONALD WITTEK