EditGeorgia under scrutiny: what EU sanctions over the Kulevi oil terminal could mean
Brussels is weighing unprecedented energy-related measures against a third country, challenging Tbilisi’s claim that it is not helping Moscow bypass EU sanctions
The Georgian government is facing a new and potentially serious challenge, as the European Union considers sanctions that could, for the first time, target a key piece of the country’s energy infrastructure.
According to Reuters and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the EU’s 20th sanctions package against Russia – which Brussels hopes to finalise by the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – includes possible restrictive measures related to Georgia’s Black Sea oil terminal in Kulevi.
A draft prepared by EU diplomats reportedly states that the Georgian port has been used for maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products produced in Russia, or carried by Russian tankers operating through what the document describes as “irregular and high-risk schemes”.
If confirmed, this would mark the first instance in which the EU applies so-called “energy sanctions” to a third country, significantly raising the political and economic stakes for Tbilisi.
The move would also directly contradict the long-standing narrative of Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, which has repeatedly insisted that the country does not assist Russia in bypassing Western sanctions. The implications could extend beyond EU-Georgia relations, affecting Georgia’s broader geopolitical positioning.
A terminal under scrutiny
The Kulevi oil terminal is located on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, between the ports of Poti and Anaklia, in the Khobi municipality. It is owned by Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR and has been operating for decades, dating back to the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze.
Its strategic importance increased further at the end of 2025, when a newly built oil refinery began operations nearby. Construction of the refinery started in 2024 and was planned in six phases over three to four years. Initial capacity was set at 1.12 million tonnes of oil per year, with plans to expand to nearly 4 million tonnes.
The project’s total investment was estimated at $600-700 million, with financing that included Georgia’s state Development Fund. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze personally attended the project’s presentation in October 2024.
Reports that Russian oil had begun arriving at Kulevi surfaced late last year. In October 2025, Reuters reported that Russian oil company Russneft had delivered its first shipment of crude to the newly built Kulevi refinery.
Shortly afterwards, Russian investigative outlet Proekt published an in-depth report on alleged links between the family owning the refinery and Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU. The report stated that the founder and main owner of Georgia’s first oil refinery importing Russian oil is businesswoman Maka Asatiani, whose son previously ran a joint business in Russia with the son of Vladimir Alexeyev, the first deputy head of the GRU. Alexeyev was shot in Moscow on 6 February.
Tensions escalated further in early February. On 5 February, Georgian investigative outlet iFact reported that the tanker Silvari, identified as part of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”, entered Georgia’s territorial waters for the first time on 30 January, delivering around 32,000 tonnes of oil and petroleum products.
iFact also reported that between 2024 and 2026, 19 vessels matching the characteristics of Russia’s shadow fleet had entered Georgian ports, including Kulevi.
While Georgian officials denied the claims, the EU appears unconvinced.
Brussels versus Tbilisi
According to the draft sanctions package, the use of the Georgian port for transporting Russian oil through “irregular and high-risk schemes” threatens the effectiveness of EU sanctions and could facilitate their circumvention.
If Kulevi were added to the EU sanctions list, the port would not be shut down. However, financial transactions and cooperation with European companies would become significantly more difficult.
The Georgian Dream government has categorically rejected the allegations and said it is ready to provide Brussels with detailed explanations.
“Georgia strictly complies with all rules related to the sanctions regime – that is my position,” Prime Minister Kobakhidze said, adding that the government was open to discussions and information exchange with the EU.
Georgia’s Maritime Transport Agency issued a separate statement denying that sanctioned tankers had been received and saying inspections had found no sanctions violations.
The sensitivity of the issue for Tbilisi is clear. If the EU proceeds, it would be the first time Georgian infrastructure has been included in an EU sanctions regime, a step that could have far-reaching political consequences.
Looking to Washington
Relations between Georgian Dream and Brussels have deteriorated sharply in recent years, making a reset without a change of government increasingly unlikely.
Yet the strong reaction to possible EU sanctions is not driven solely by economic concerns. Despite strained ties with the EU, Georgian Dream continues to hope for improved relations with Washington – specifically with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.
Prime Minister Kobakhidze recently said Georgia was ready to restore its strategic partnership with the United States and was waiting for further steps from Washington.
The ruling party has sought to signal ideological alignment with Trump, emphasising opposition to the “deep state” and liberal values, and relying in part on lobbying by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
So far, these efforts have yielded little. A recent regional visit by U.S. Vice President JD Vance to Armenia and Azerbaijan underscored that Washington now has other strategic partners in the South Caucasus – and Georgia is not among them.
If the EU sanctions Georgia over facilitating Russian energy exports, the fallout could extend to U.S. relations as well. The Trump administration has taken a hard line on third countries’ energy cooperation with Russia, raising the risk that U.S. sanctions could follow.
That is a scenario Georgian Dream is seeking to avoid – but it’s precisely the one that is becoming increasingly difficult to rule out.
A longer version of this article in Ukrainian by EUalive’s partner European Pravda can be found here.
Caption: The Kulevi oil terminal [SOCAR]
Updated: February 13, 2026 - 07:35
