From Greenland to Iceland: Arctic tensions as a window of opportunity for deeper EU engagement

President Donald Trump’s repeated threats to take control of Greenland have not only rattled Denmark and exposed cracks in transatlantic trust but have also triggered an unexpected chain reaction in the High North: Iceland is now seriously reconsidering EU membership, with a referendum on reopening accession talks set for 29 August 2026.

A new policy brief published today by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) under the think nea initiative argues that the Greenland crisis has transformed the Arctic from a peripheral climate issue into a frontline test of European strategic autonomy – and that Brussels must seize the moment in Reykjavik without derailing its core enlargement priorities in the Western Balkans and Ukraine.

Since taking office in January 2025, Trump has repeatedly claimed that Denmark cannot protect Greenland from Russian or Chinese influence and has even floated acquiring the autonomous Danish territory outright. Although he signalled de-escalation at Davos, the episode has left lasting damage. European states rallied behind Copenhagen with joint military exercises, while Denmark announced a major increase in its Arctic presence. London and Oslo proposed an “Arctic Sentry” NATO mission as a multilateral alternative to unilateral American action.

The brief, authored by Ioannis Alexandris and Dimitra Koutouzi, highlights how the affair has deepened pre-existing divisions inside the EU on security and defence. France pushes hard for European strategic autonomy and industrial sovereignty (“buy European”), the Netherlands prefers a cautious, NATO-first incremental approach, and Poland and the Baltic states remain heavily reliant on direct American guarantees. These differences, the authors warn, complicate any coherent EU response and make crises like Greenland symptomatic of a deeper question: is US unpredictability a temporary hiccup or a structural shift?

Iceland, sitting astride the critical GIUK gap (Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom), now finds itself in the spotlight. The island has no standing army and relies on a 1951 bilateral defence agreement with the United States. Trump’s transactional style has politicised that dependence, prompting Reykjavik to look elsewhere for long-term security.

Prime Minister Kristrún Frostadóttir announced plans for a referendum on whether to revive the EU accession process that was frozen in 2015. Public polls show a slim majority (45%) in favour, with 35% opposed. The vote is not on membership itself but on reopening negotiations — a clever domestic compromise that still gives the EU a fresh window of opportunity.

Iceland is already deeply integrated into the EU’s single market through the European Economic Area and participates in Schengen. Accession chapters opened between 2010 and 2013 could be reactivated quickly. Foreign Minister Þorgeður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir has even claimed Iceland could finish talks in “a year and a half” and beat Montenegro to become the 28th member state.

The strategic upside for the EU is considerable. Closer ties would secure access to Icelandic geothermal and hydroelectric expertise for the bloc’s decarbonisation goals, improve Arctic surveillance through Galileo satellites, and bolster supply-chain resilience along emerging northern sea routes. In an extreme scenario of renewed US–EU tensions, the EU’s Article 42.7 mutual assistance clause could gain real relevance.

Yet the brief sounds a clear note of caution. Fast-tracking a “low-friction” candidate like Iceland risks becoming a convenient “fig leaf” for enlargement-sceptic member states. It could allow them to claim progress on enlargement while avoiding the politically painful institutional reforms needed for a union of 30-plus members – and at the expense of long-stalled candidates in the Western Balkans.

The authors stress that any northern enlargement must complement, not compete with, existing priorities. Progress on Iceland should go hand-in-hand with advancing Montenegro and maintaining credible prospects for Ukraine and the Western Balkans. Otherwise, frustration among candidates who have waited more than a decade could erode the entire process.

Ultimately, the ELIAMEP paper concludes that enlargement is no longer just about economics or values. In a world of transactional great-power competition, it has become a tool of geopolitical stabilisation. The High North – from Nuuk to Reykjavik – now offers the EU a chance to prove it can act strategically, reduce dependence on an unpredictable Washington, and shape the security architecture of the North Atlantic.

Whether Brussels seizes that chance – or lets another window close – will say much about the Union’s ability to navigate the new age of disorder.

Iceland’s renewed EU ambitions: referendum on the horizon amid historical hurdles

Caption: Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen (in blue) and Denmark’s King Frederik X (in red) visit the Arctic Basic Training in Kangerlussuaq, Greenland, 20 February 2026. King Frederik X is on an official three-day visit to Greenland. The Arctic Basic Training is a military program managed by the Joint Arctic Command and the Danish Armed Forces, to provide young Greenlandic citizens with military and emergency response training. EPA/BO AMSTRUP