From burden to asset: reframing the Western Balkans in EU’s strategic thinking

The geopolitical moment calls for a fundamental shift in perspective: not only what the European Union can do for the Western Balkans, but what the region can do for the EU, writes Dr. Ana Krstinovska.

Dr. Ana Krstinovska is Senior Researcher, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration; Research Fellow, Wider Europe Programme, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

Perceptions that the Western Balkans are merely a burden for the EU – problematic, unstable, and peripheral – are becoming increasingly outdated. The region is certainly not without flaws, and many structural and political challenges persist. Yet, these are precisely the kinds of issues that can be most effectively addressed within the EU accession process, through targeted reforms and sustained engagement. More importantly, the geopolitical moment calls for a fundamental shift in perspective: not only what the European Union can do for the Western Balkans, but what the region can do for the EU.

This question becomes more pressing as the EU faces mounting external and internal pressures. Russia’s war in Ukraine and its increasingly assertive posture, uncertainty in transatlantic relations, China’s economic upper-hand, and the escalation of tensions in the Middle East all point to a more volatile strategic environment. In navigating these challenges, the EU must rely on every available partner, no matter how small. In that regard, the Western Balkans are not external to the European project; they are geographically surrounded by the EU and economically embedded within it, with a clear interest in supporting its stability and resilience.

The cost of strategic myopia

Yet, engagement with the region has remained largely confined to the enlargement framework. While accession is central, it has often been treated as the only meaningful channel of cooperation. In parallel, the Western Balkans have been largely absent from some of the EU’s most prominent and forward-looking policy debates, including those related to strategic autonomy. This reflects not only a policy gap, but also a lack of vision regarding how the EU can anchor and utilize the region’s potential, especially in periods when enlargement itself progresses slowly and slips from immediate political focus.

Concrete examples illustrate what is being overlooked. In the field of defense production, a single company in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Pretis currently has the capacity to supply around half a million artillery shells annually – half of the declared target of 1 million that the EU failed to meet by March 2024 as pledged. The company has planned to scale up that capacity to 1 million shells with investment from the U.S.-based Regulus Global until 2028, at a time when the EU’s target is to sustain the production capacity of 2 million in the next few years. This is not marginal capacity; it is strategically significant, yet it remains insufficiently integrated into European planning and new instruments like the SAFE regulation.

A similar pattern emerges in the domain of critical raw materials. According to a recent thinknea study, the Western Balkans – particularly Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania – are important producers of copper, with a combined production value of approximately €2 billion. Despite this, around 70% of Serbian copper exports are directed toward China, while the EU continues to import the bulk of its copper from distant suppliers such as Brazil, Chile, and Peru.

Currently, the Western Balkans account for only 3.1% of EU imports of copper ores and concentrates and 1.9% of copper articles. However, in a hypothetical scenario where Serbian exports to China were redirected toward the EU, these figures would increase dramatically – to 23.7% and 14%, respectively, elevating the region to one of the EU’s top suppliers. Such a shift would not only strengthen supply security but also reduce geopolitical exposure and logistical costs.

The same logic applies to aluminium. The Western Balkans presently account for 5.6% of EU aluminium imports, with significant exports – particularly from Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina – again directed toward China. A reorientation of these flows could raise the region’s share to around 8%, positioning it as the EU’s fourth-largest supplier.

An “upgraded” enlargement framework

These examples are not arguments for transactionalism. The point is not to trade enlargement prospects or core values for short-term economic or security gains. Rather, it is to embed accession within a framework of mutual, tangible benefits, where reforms in the Western Balkans are directly linked to immediate contributions to the EU’s strategic priorities and inclusion in policy instruments. Such an approach would reinforce incentives for reform while demonstrating that integration yields concrete gains well before formal membership.

At the same time, it would foster a more accurate understanding of interdependence. The relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans is not optional or symbolic; it is structural. Supply chains, security dynamics, and political stability are deeply interconnected. Disruptions or missed opportunities on one side inevitably affect the other.

Admittedly, these transformations cannot happen overnight. Serbia, for example, cannot easily unwind its economic dependence on China, particularly given the scale of Chinese investment and the existence of a free trade agreement. Likewise, the recent U.S. investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s defense sector signals both the region’s untapped potential and the extent to which European actors have been absent in recognizing it.

These developments are the result of a longstanding lack of strategic vision. But they also serve as a warning. If the EU continues to approach the Western Balkans solely as future members, defined by a distant and uncertain accession timeline, it risks overlooking their immediate and practical value.

It is therefore time for a conceptual shift. The Western Balkans should be treated not only as candidates, but as partners and allies whose contributions are already relevant. Engaging them as such – through inclusion in strategic sectors, supply chains, and emerging policy frameworks -would not only benefit the region, but also strengthen the EU’s capacity to respond to an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.

Caption: AI-generated illustrative image.