Fire Point: Ukraine’s wartime defence phenom – rapid rise, big ambitions, lingering shadows

In the chaos of Russia’s full-scale invasion, few Ukrainian companies have risen as dramatically as Fire Point. From a small volunteer effort producing long-range strike drones in 2022, it has become one of the country’s most critical defence suppliers – delivering thousands of affordable kamikaze drones that strike deep into Russian territory and developing advanced systems like the FP-5 “Flamingo” cruise missile.

By early 2026, the Kyiv-based firm employed over 3,500 people, secured billions in contracts, and expanded internationally with projects in Denmark and talks for European air-defence collaboration

Yet its meteoric success embodies the contradictions of wartime Ukraine: extraordinary ingenuity and ambition alongside persistent allegations of favouritism, opaque connections, and corruption probes. Fire Point is both a symbol of resilience and a flashpoint for debates over who truly profits from the war.

Humble origins, explosive growth

Co-founders Denis Shtilerman (majority owner) and Yegor Skalyga (school friends) started modestly. Shtilerman, a former Russian citizen with a background in physics and brief work at Russia’s Defence Ministry, funded early development with roughly $2 million of his own money. Skalyga came from film production, including location scouting tied to Zelenskyy’s old studio.

They identified a critical gap: cheap, long-range kamikaze drones. The FP-1 (nicknamed “Anton” by troops) was designed for simplicity and cost – a basic airframe with a 50 kg warhead, up to 800 km range, and a target price around $55,000–60,000 per unit. This was far cheaper than Russian Geran-2 or Iranian Shahed drones. Production emphasized speed and minimalism: “four sticks tied with string,” as Shtilerman described the innovative wound spars that became a hallmark.

By late 2022, a handful of employees had a prototype. It flew in early 2023 and was codified by the Defence Ministry in May. The company leveraged a government “experiment” that simplified procurement for drone makers, allowing 70% prepayment while capping profits at 25%. Fire Point quickly won contracts, delivering hundreds of FP-1s for deep strikes.

Growth was staggering. In 2024, with massive budget allocations for drones (partly funded by allies like Denmark’s “Danish model”), Fire Point became a dominant supplier. It now produces thousands of long-range drones monthly, alongside FP-2 medium-range variants. Its systems reportedly account for a large share of Ukrainian strikes on Russian targets, including a notable role in attacks on Moscow facilities as recently as June 2026.

The company didn’t stop at drones. In 2024, following a reported nudge from President Zelenskyy, it pivoted to missiles. The pink-painted FP-5 “Flamingo” – a simplified long-range cruise missile with a massive payload (over 1,000 kg) and potential 3,000 km range – was developed at record speed by winding carbon-fiber bodies on massive custom machines. Fire Point has also tested ballistic missile concepts and is partnering on a new European air-defence system called Freya. Plans include a rocket-fuel plant in Denmark.

Fire Point shows Flamingo and other missiles at the exhibition in Paris pic.twitter.com/8RW9Bl0663
— In Ukraine (@InUKRofficial) June 17, 2026

Military commanders praise the products as effective and relatively affordable. International partners have shown trust through funding and collaboration. This rapid scaling highlights Ukraine’s wartime defence ecosystem: private initiative filling gaps where state industry lagged, creating jobs, and boosting strategic autonomy.

Controversies and corruption allegations

Success has not come without scrutiny. Fire Point has faced multiple investigations and public criticism, painting a picture of potential cronyism in Ukraine’s high-stakes defence procurement.

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) has probed whether the company inflated component costs (e.g., motors), leading to alleged overpayments by the state. Auditors and investigators compared procurement prices across firms, estimating possible overcharges in the billions of hryvnia for 2023–2024 contracts. Fire Point denies wrongdoing, arguing comparisons ignored volume discounts, delivery timelines, and different specifications. As of mid-2026, the company and its founders are not formal suspects in the main probe, though the investigation continues.

Far more explosive are alleged ties to Timur Mindich, a businessman sanctioned in late 2025 and central to the high-profile “Midas” NABU case involving a massive alleged corruption scheme at state energy company Energoatom. Leaked recordings (“Mindich tapes”) captured him lobbying Defence Minister Rustem Umerov on Fire Point’s behalf, discussing payments and problems. Mindich reportedly sought a large stake in the company (offering up to nearly $1 billion), though Shtilerman claims he ultimately declined in favor of a UAE sovereign fund deal (30% for ~$760 million).

Shtilerman acknowledges meetings with Mindich and connections through intermediaries but insists Mindich never owned shares and that any lobbying stemmed from potential buyer interest. Critics, including anti-corruption activists and some competitors, call for partial nationalisation, arguing the company monopolises contracts through political access rather than pure merit. Fire Point counters that its products work, prices are competitive, and scrutiny is sometimes weaponized by rivals.

The firm’s pre-war roots as a casting/locations agency (linked loosely to entertainment circles around Zelenskyy) fuel skepticism about how outsiders rapidly mastered advanced aerospace tech. Competitors question the speed of missile development and suggest hidden know-how or influence.

A mirror of wartime Ukraine

Fire Point encapsulates Ukraine’s wartime reality: desperate innovation born of necessity, where volunteers and entrepreneurs with diverse (sometimes checkered) backgrounds pivot to defence and deliver results when state systems stumble. It shows the power of simplified rules and private capital in scaling production under existential threat – while exposing vulnerabilities to favouritism in an opaque, high-pressure procurement environment flooded with billions in aid and budget funds.

Supporters see a national champion driving technological leaps and economic multipliers (spurring suppliers and jobs). Detractors worry about monopolization, inflated costs draining resources, and eroded trust. The company continues operations, with plans for further expansion, even as probes linger and calls for transparency grow.

In many ways, Fire Point is Ukraine in miniature – ambitious, contradictory, resilient, and still fighting not just the external enemy but internal challenges of governance and accountability amid the fog of war. Its story is far from over.

The much longer article in Ukrainian by our partner Suspilne can be found here.

Caption: The photo shows the FP-5 “Flamingo” cruise missile developed by Ukrainian firm Fire Point (FPRT), displayed at the French defence exhibition Eurosatory 2026 with a claimed 3,000 km range and 1,150 kg payload for striking fixed geographic coordinates.[@defensehere_fr on X]