EditEU’s Growth Plan for Western Balkans: ambitious promises, limited impact
While Western Balkan countries receive €28.9 per capita in EU grants, EU member states like Greece receive nine times more
In a bid to reinvigorate its enlargement strategy, the European Commission launched the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, a cornerstone of its response to geopolitical shifts sparked by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Yet, according to a critical analysis by Matteo Bonomi of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, this initiative – centered on the Reform and Growth Facility – falls short of delivering transformative change, offering instead a modest recalibration of existing frameworks that risks perpetuating the region’s economic and political stagnation.
Bonomi’s working paper, published by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, argues that the Growth Plan, despite its rhetoric of gradual integration, fails to provide a meaningful pathway to EU membership for Western Balkan countries. The plan’s four pillars- integration into the EU Single Market, regional economic cooperation, country-specific reforms, and a €6 billion financial package – are ambitious in scope but lack the substance to address the region’s deep-seated challenges.
The first pillar, aimed at enhancing access to the EU Single Market, offers little beyond existing Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs). Measures like integration into the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), which could save €500 million annually by reducing remittance costs, are promising but insufficient. Persistent barriers, such as delays in certificate recognition and the absence of a common visa policy, continue to hinder trade and business. Bonomi notes that the plan’s focus on long-term goals, like energy cooperation and supply chain integration, lacks concrete mechanisms for pre-membership participation in EU policies.
The second pillar, emphasising regional economic integration through the Common Regional Market, is equally problematic. While intended to mirror EU-style free movement of goods, services, and workers, its implementation is hampered by political tensions, notably between Belgrade and Pristina. Bonomi critiques the Commission’s optimistic assumption that regional cooperation will seamlessly pave the way for EU integration, pointing out that there’s no automatic mechanism to translate regional gains into broader EU market access. Claims of a potential 10% GDP boost, as cited by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, are overstated, with World Bank studies suggesting far more modest gains – closer to 1.5% for most countries.
The plan’s third and fourth pillars, centered on reforms and the Reform and Growth Facility, introduce some innovation by mimicking the EU’s NextGenerationEU model. The €6 billion package (€3 billion in grants, €3 billion in loans) ties funding to ambitious reform agendas, covering governance, rule of law, and economic policy. However, Bonomi highlights significant hurdles: a tight 2027 deadline, vague reform objectives, and complex conditionalities risk overwhelming the region’s fragile administrative systems. The grant component, a mere €2 billion, pales in comparison to the €357 billion allocated to EU member states under NextGenerationEU, underscoring a stark disparity. For instance, while Western Balkan countries receive €28.9 per capita in EU grants, Southeastern EU member states like Greece receive up to €5,696 – nine times more.
Bonomi argues that the plan’s reliance on existing frameworks, like the SAAs and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, limits its transformative potential. The Western Balkans’ economic convergence with the EU remains elusive, with growth rates lagging since 2009. Political obstacles, including enlargement fatigue among EU member states, further complicate the process. The plan’s fragmented approach and modest financial scope fail to address structural issues like economic stagnation and social unrest, risking it becoming “merely an accompaniment” to ongoing challenges.
As the EU extends similar initiatives to Ukraine and Moldova, Bonomi warns that these may replicate the same shortcomings: limited resources, unclear scope, and an absence of intermediate membership status. Without a bolder, more coherent strategy, the Growth Plan is unlikely to be the game-changer the Western Balkans need. Instead, it serves as a reminder of the EU’s struggle to balance geopolitical ambitions with practical, impactful policy.
This publication is available in Open Access in Cadmus, the EUI Research Repository
Caption: (L-R) Finland’s Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, President of Montenegro Jakov Milatovic and European Council President Antonio Costa attend a family photo at the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Brussels, Belgium, 18 December 2024. EU and Western Balkans leaders are meeting in Brussels to discuss strengthening regional cooperation and partnerships. EPA/OLIVIER HOSLET
Updated: July 24, 2025 - 11:53
