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Europe’s energy paradox: still funding Russia while falling into America’s grip

Belgium's Zeebrugge stands out as the single major European terminal where Russia remains the top LNG supplier

EUalive with Focus Europe.pl May 18, 2026 13:49

In 2022, the European Union launched the REPowerEU program with an ambitious goal: to eliminate dependence on Russian fossil fuels by 2027. By 2025, the European Commission had outlined a detailed timetable for a full phase-out, and in January 2026, member states formally adopted regulations to end Russian gas imports by the autumn of 2027. Yet reality tells a different story. Russian liquefied natural gas continues to reach European ports in record volumes, undermining the continent’s energy emancipation narrative and channeling billions of euros into the Russian economy as the war in Ukraine stretches into its fifth year.

The data is striking. In the first quarter of 2026, EU imports of Russian LNG hit a historic quarterly high, rising 16 percent year-on-year according to the Institute of Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). Russia remains the second-largest supplier of LNG to the bloc after the United States. Between 2022 and 2025, European countries spent roughly €281 billion on LNG imports overall, with €37.8 billion flowing directly to the Russian budget. In 2025 alone, Russian LNG accounted for 14 percent of the EU’s total LNG imports, costing €6.7 billion – on top of €5.9 billion for remaining pipeline deliveries. Far from severing financial ties, the war simply transformed the nature of Europe’s energy relationship with Moscow.

The unbroken flow of Russian LNG

Official EU statements highlight progress, noting that Russian gas now represents only about 13 percent of total energy imports, down from 39 percent before the full-scale invasion. Pipeline deliveries have indeed plummeted. However, this masks a sharp rise in LNG trade. Volumes of Russian LNG imported to Europe nearly tripled in absolute terms between the first quarter of 2021 and the second quarter of 2025. Approximately 75 percent of these supplies originate from the Yamal LNG terminal, operated by Novatek. Icebreaking tankers navigate Arctic routes to deliver cargoes directly to key Western European ports, evading some of the infrastructure vulnerabilities that sanctions might otherwise exploit.

Terminals in Zeebrugge (Belgium), Dunkerque and Montoir-de-Bretagne (France), and Bilbao (Spain) have absorbed growing volumes. Zeebrugge stands out as the only major European terminal where Russia remains the top LNG supplier, with imports rising 23 percent year-on-year in early 2026. France has shown particularly heavy reliance, sourcing 35 percent of its LNG from Russia in the first quarter of 2026—a record share. Spain increased its Russian LNG purchases by 43 percent, and Belgium by 23 percent. This creates a striking paradox: nations vocal in their support for Ukraine continue to provide substantial revenue to the Russian state through energy purchases.

Analysts from Bruegel and the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) note that the global LNG market’s liquidity and complex trading chains enable indirect deliveries even where direct contracts face restrictions. Up to 20 percent of Russian LNG may be re-exported, and enforcement of the EU’s March 2025 ban on transshipment services remains technically challenging due to opaque supply chains.

A costly escape into American dependence

As Europe reduces pipeline dependence on Russia, it has pivoted aggressively toward LNG from the United States. American LNG exports to Europe more than tripled from 29.8 billion cubic meters in 2021 to 99.5 billion cubic meters in 2025. By the first quarter of 2026, the U.S. supplied 63 percent of the EU’s LNG, with forecasts suggesting it could reach two-thirds for the full year. Countries like Germany (89 percent US LNG), Croatia (87 percent), and Poland (75 percent) illustrate the depth of this shift.

The July 2025 EU-U.S. trade agreement, under which Europe committed to purchasing $750 billion of American energy over three years, has accelerated this trend. While this has diversified away from Russia in one sense, it has replaced it with concentrated reliance on another single supplier. IEEFA warns that the US share could climb to 75–80 percent by 2030, or even as early as 2028–2029, creating fresh geopolitical risks and exposing Europe to high prices and potential supply disruptions.

The Middle East crisis has compounded these challenges. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the March attack on Qatar’s Ras Laffan complex slashed Qatari LNG exports, previously Europe’s third-largest source, by 29 percent year-on-year in early 2026. Nations such as Italy, Poland, and Belgium, which depended heavily on Qatari gas, felt the impact immediately. With Qatar sidelined, Europe leaned even harder on U.S. and Russian supplies, both of which posted record quarterly figures.

This dependence carries clear economic and strategic costs. LNG is generally more expensive than pipeline gas, and heavy reliance on seaborne imports leaves Europe vulnerable to global market volatility, shipping constraints, and distant geopolitical events. As IEEFA’s Ana Maria Jaller-Makarewicz observed, LNG has become the Achilles’ heel of Europe’s energy security strategy. The intended diversification has instead locked the continent into high prices and new forms of external control.

Experts increasingly argue that accelerating the green transition offers the only sustainable exit. Electrifying large parts of the economy, boosting energy efficiency, deploying renewables at scale, and expanding heat pumps could permanently lower gas demand. IEEFA projects European gas consumption could fall 14 percent between 2025 and 2030, with LNG demand dropping even more sharply. Organizations like the International Energy Agency and CREA caution that prolonged dependence on major fossil fuel suppliers, whether Russian or American, threatens the EU’s 2050 climate neutrality targets and risks creating stranded assets.

Europe’s timeline remains ambitious on paper: bans on short-term Russian LNG imports began in April 2026, with longer-term contracts targeted for 2027. Pipeline restrictions follow a similar schedule. Russia, meanwhile, plans to triple its LNG export capacity by 2035, redirecting volumes to Asia if necessary. For Europe, the 2026 experience underscores a hard truth: as long as the continent chooses to remain heavily dependent on gas, it will remain exposed to geopolitical manipulation and price shocks.

Declarations from Brussels have not yet translated into full independence. Arctic LNG tankers continue docking at European ports, quarterly records keep falling, and a new transatlantic energy bond grows tighter. True energy security will require more than swapping one supplier for another, it demands a decisive acceleration toward efficiency and renewables before the next crisis exposes the strategy’s remaining flaws.

The original analysis by EUalive’s partner Focus Europe.pl can be found here.

Caption: Greenpeace activists from 17 European countries in kayaks block the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal operated by Fluxys in Zeebrugge, Belgium, 1 October 2025, with a float featuring inflatable figures of US President Trump and Russian President Putin to protest Europe’s dependence on fossil gas, which the activists argue contributes to geopolitical instability, and call for an end to fossil gas imports and a transition to renewable energy to improve energy independence. The Zeebrugge LNG terminal is a key European gas hub, offering services such as import, storage, and regasification. EPA/OLIVIER HOSLET

Updated: May 18, 2026 - 13:49

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