EU to end all Russian gas and oil imports by 2027, signals robust energy sanctions

On 6 May, the European Commission announced a comprehensive plan to phase out all imports of Russian gas and oil by the end of 2027, a landmark move to sever energy ties with Moscow in response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The announcement, detailed in a press release by the European Commission, underscores the EU’s commitment to energy independence and includes measures to tackle sanctions circumvention, restrict Russian nuclear materials, and enhance traceability of gas imports.

EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen emphasized the economic and geopolitical implications of this transition, noting, “Since February 2022, we’ve actually spent more money buying fossil fuels from Russia in the EU than we’ve given in aid to Ukraine.” This statement highlights the urgency of the EU’s pivot away from Russian energy, which has indirectly funded Moscow’s war efforts. Jørgensen also cautioned against reverting to Russian imports even if a peace deal is reached, citing the unreliability of Russia as an energy partner.

The EU’s strategy builds on the REPowerEU Plan, adopted in May 2022, which aimed to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels through diversification, renewables, and energy efficiency. The Commission reports that most REPowerEU targets have been met, with significant reductions in Russian energy imports already achieved. However, challenges remain, particularly for countries still reliant on Russian supplies and due to Russia’s ability to circumvent sanctions.

EU’s reduction of Russian gas and oil imports since 2022

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU has made substantial progress in reducing its reliance on Russian fossil fuels. Prior to the invasion, Russia supplied approximately 45% of the EU’s gas imports (155 billion cubic meters, or bcm, in 2021) and 27% of its oil imports. By 2024, these figures had dropped dramatically:

Gas Imports: The share of Russian gas in EU imports fell from 45% in 2021 to 19% by the end of 2024, with total imports decreasing from 155 bcm to approximately 54 bcm (including 32 bcm via pipeline and 20 bcm as liquefied natural gas, or LNG). This represents a reduction of about 65% in volume. Notably, pipeline gas imports plummeted after Russia cut supplies and the Nord Stream pipelines were halted, though LNG imports rose by 18% from 2023 to 2024, reaching 16.5 million metric tons.

Oil Imports: Russian oil imports dropped from 27% of the EU’s total share in 2022 to just 3% by the end of 2024. The EU banned seaborne imports of Russian crude oil starting December 5, 2022, and refined oil products from February 5, 2023. These sanctions, combined with a G7 price cap, reduced EU imports by approximately 90%. In monetary terms, EU spending on Russian fossil fuels fell from €16 billion per month in early 2022 to €1 billion per month by late 2023.

Coal Imports: The EU imposed a complete ban on Russian coal imports in August 2022, reducing Russia’s share from 47.9% in 2021 to zero by the end of 2022.

The EU achieved this decoupling by diversifying suppliers—Norway (33.6% of gas imports in 2024), the United States (16.7%), and Algeria (14.1%) became major gas providers—and accelerating renewable energy deployment. Gas consumption also fell by 10-12% in 2022 due to efficiency measures, milder weather, and reduced industrial demand.

Despite these achievements, the EU spent €21.9 billion on Russian fossil fuels in 2024, a meagre 1% reduction from the previous year, surpassing the €18.7 billion in financial aid to Ukraine (excluding military aid). This gap underscores the need for further action to meet the 2027 phase-out goal.

EU countries still reliant on Russian oil and gas

While the EU as a whole has reduced its dependence, several member states continue to rely heavily on Russian energy, particularly gas and nuclear fuel, due to infrastructure constraints, long-term contracts, and political resistance to sanctions:

Hungary: Hungary remains one of the most dependent on Russian energy, receiving gas via the TurkStream pipeline and maintaining exclusive reliance on Russian nuclear fuel for its four nuclear reactors. Hungary’s government, led by Viktor Orbán, has actively opposed EU sanctions on Russian gas, citing economic concerns. Gazprom supplies excess gas to Hungary, enabling resale to third countries, which generates significant tax revenue.

Slovakia: Slovakia also depends on Russian gas through the TurkStream pipeline and earns approximately $1.5 billion annually from reselling and transiting Russian gas. Like Hungary, it relies entirely on Russian nuclear fuel and technology. Slovakia has resisted gas sanctions, arguing that alternatives would increase energy costs.

Austria: Russian gas constitutes the majority of Austria’s gas imports, primarily delivered via pipelines through Ukraine (until the transit contract ended in January 2025). Austrian manufacturers have protested the loss of these supplies, though alternatives via TurkStream are available.

Belgium, France, and Spain: These countries are major entry points for Russian LNG, with imports rising by 12% in 2022 compared to 2021. France, in particular, maintains nuclear ties with Russia, importing enriched uranium and collaborating with Rosatom on projects. The absence of an EU-wide ban on LNG has allowed these imports to continue.

Bulgaria doesn’t import Russian gas, but gets transit fees for transporting gas to Serbia, Hungary, Austria via TurkStream, called BalkanStream on Bulgarian territory.

Moldova (non-EU but relevant): Moldova is heavily dependent on Russian gas and faces significant challenges as supplies are rerouted, exacerbating energy insecurity.

Hungary and Slovakia’s resistance has blocked unanimous EU sanctions on Russian gas, as sanctions require approval from all 27 member states. The European Commission is exploring legal mechanisms, such as invoking “force majeure” to release companies from “take-or-pay” contracts with Gazprom, though this risks penalties or arbitration.

Russia’s redirection of oil and gas exports to other markets

Russia has mitigated the impact of EU sanctions by redirecting its oil and gas exports to non-Western markets, particularly in Asia, and by exploiting sanctions loopholes. Despite a 6% revenue drop in 2024 (€242 billion from fossil fuels globally), Russia has earned an estimated €847 billion from fossil fuel exports since the invasion, demonstrating resilience in its energy trade.

Oil Exports: Russia has shifted oil exports to China, India, and Turkey, which now account for the majority of its crude and refined product sales. In 2023, India’s Vadinar refinery, 49% owned by Russia’s Rosneft, processed 82 million barrels of Russian crude, supplying refined products like diesel to the EU through a sanctions loophole. This “refining loophole” allows Russian crude to be processed in third countries and sold to the EU as non-Russian products, generating an estimated €1.1 billion in tax revenue for the Kremlin in 2023. Russia also employs a “shadow fleet” of 558 aging, poorly maintained tankers to transport 61% of its seaborne oil exports (€83 billion in 2024), evading the G7’s $60 per barrel price cap.

Gas Exports: Russia has struggled to replace the EU market for natural gas due to limited pipeline infrastructure to Asia. Exports to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline fetch lower prices ($10/MWh compared to $34/MWh in Europe), and volumes are constrained. Gazprom’s revenues fell 70% in the first half of 2023 compared to 2018-2022 averages, reflecting the loss of the lucrative EU market. However, Russia has increased LNG exports to the EU and other markets, capitalizing on the absence of sanctions on LNG.

Coal Exports: After the EU’s coal ban, Russia redirected coal exports to Asia, particularly China and India, though global coal revenues (€23 billion in 2024) are less significant than oil and gas.

Russia’s ability to bypass sanctions is facilitated by lax enforcement and the use of intermediaries. For example, G7+ countries imported €18 billion in oil products from Indian and Turkish refineries in 2024, with €9 billion derived from Russian crude, generating €4 billion in taxes for Russia. The EU is now proposing measures to close the refining loophole, restrict TurkStream gas flows, and target the shadow fleet to further curb Russia’s revenues.

Challenges and future steps

The EU’s plan to eliminate Russian energy imports by 2027 faces several hurdles. Securing alternative supplies is critical, with new LNG projects in the US and Qatar expected to come online by 2026, potentially stabilising prices. However, competition for LNG is intensifying, particularly from China, which could strain global supplies. The EU is also betting on renewables, with a 700 GW increase in renewable capacity in 2024, to reduce fossil fuel demand.

Sanctions circumvention remains a persistent issue. The EU aims to enhance traceability of Russian gas and restrict nuclear material imports, but unanimous agreement among member states is elusive. Hungary’s veto power and the economic interests of countries like Slovakia complicate progress. The Commission’s upcoming roadmap, delayed due to uncertainties around US trade policies under President Donald Trump, will propose tariffs on Russian gas and measures to counter the shadow fleet.

Other sources: European Commission, Eurostat data, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA, Global Witness investigation

Caption: EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen on 6 May 2025 [Europe by Satellite]