Energy, China, and geopolitical realignment: interpreting Trump’s renewed pressure on Iran and Venezuela

During his first presidential term, Donald Trump pursued a policy of “maximum pressure” toward Iran, withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 8 May 2018, and reimposing sanctions that severely impacted the country’s financial and energy sectors. Simultaneously, U.S. sanctions on Venezuela were intensified, focusing primarily on the oil industry and limiting the country’s ability to export crude, access international markets, and secure financing.

What is relevant for today’s analysis, however, is not merely what happened then, but what is resurfacing in a fundamentally altered international landscape. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing wave of sanctions, the convergence between Russia and China in energy, trade, and supply routes has deepened, forging denser mutual dependencies – especially concerning Asia’s energy security. In this new environment, Trump’s second term has seen renewed escalation toward both Iran and Venezuela: on one hand, through the formal reinstatement of the “maximum pressure” framework against Tehran; on the other, through stricter enforcement measures targeting Venezuela’s oil flows and the monitoring or disruption of sanctions-evasion networks.

This matters because, in both cases, energy is not a mere collateral consequence but a central instrument of pressure. Iran is linked – directly or through complex channels – to China’s crude oil supply, while Venezuela holds vast reserves and remains a potential regulator of heavy crude output. When Washington applies simultaneous pressure on these two energy hubs, the effects extend beyond the Middle East or Latin America; they reverberate across the global energy chain and, indirectly, challenge the energy security of the Chinese economy.

The broader context is the strategic rivalry between the United States and China, and the shift from “classical” geopolitics to geo-economics: sanctions, technology controls, financial instruments, maritime regulations, and, above all, control over critical flows. In this landscape, energy security transcends the price per barrel—it represents power, strategic leverage, and industrial resilience.

China, as the world’s largest energy importer, seeks to diversify its suppliers and supply routes, including through partnerships with countries outside Western influence or those in adversarial relations with Washington. Iran and Venezuela fit this profile: they offer access to high-value resources, albeit with elevated political risk due to sanctions. The more costly and uncertain this “non-Western” energy basket becomes, the greater the strain on the Chinese economy – or, at the very least, the higher the cost of its strategic alternatives.

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Meanwhile, Russia has solidified its role as a pivotal energy partner for China, particularly since 2022. This turns every U.S. move into a question of strategic calibration: does it reinforce or weaken Sino-Russian convergence? It is within this framework that discussions of a more “differentiated” approach by Donald Trump toward Moscow become relevant – not as an easy decoupling, but as a potential effort to curb the further deepening of the Moscow-Beijing axis or to introduce calibrated friction into a relationship that has already acquired structural depth.

The prevailing trend is that great-power competition is increasingly conducted through instruments of economic coercion. Within this framework, pressure on Iran and Venezuela can be seen as a dual-purpose tool: formally, as punishment or deterrence in response to security concerns and regional destabilization; substantively, as an indirect intervention in the energy “valves” that shape China’s strategic environment.

On this basis, the analysis need not rely on “hidden agreements” or assumed certainties. It is sufficient to identify the pattern: at a time when Russia has pivoted more deeply toward China due to war and sanctions, Washington – particularly under Donald Trump – appears to be pursuing moves that raise the cost of Beijing’s alternative energy pillars (Iran, Venezuela), while still leaving room for a more “selective” handling of the Russian factor.

At the same time, the European Union and NATO are witnessing a parallel shift: the possibility that U.S. strategic priorities may increasingly tilt toward Asia and the Indo-Pacific, thereby expanding Europe’s responsibilities for managing Ukraine and sustaining the continent’s overall deterrence architecture.

If we accept as plausible the hypothesis that pressure against Iran and Venezuela aligns with a broader framework of competition with China, the implications are concrete. First, for China, constrained access to certain energy flows or rising associated costs reinforces Russia’s role as an energy counterweight. Paradoxically, this dynamic may further deepen China’s dependence on Russian volumes, transit routes, and supply conditions.

Second, for Russia, any hypothetical “rebalancing” between Beijing and Washington would require political capital and economic latitude that are unlikely to materialize as long as the war and sanctions regime remain structural constraints. The notion of a “reverse Nixon” logic may serve as an analytical lens, yet its practical execution confronts hard realities: Sino-Russian interdependence has developed its own structural inertia.

Third, for Europe, the risk is not necessarily “abandonment,” but an asymmetry of strategic priorities. If Washington views China as its central long-term competitor, Europe may be expected to shoulder a greater burden on the Ukrainian front and in strengthening the continent’s security architecture – with corresponding implications for resources, defence-industrial capacity, and political cohesion.

The key conclusion is not that “everything can be explained by China.” Rather, particularly during Trump’s second term and in the post-2022 environment, decisions to apply pressure on Iran and Venezuela can be understood as part of a broader geo-economic recalibration, in which energy emerges as the most immediate instrument for influencing the resilience and cost base of Chinese power – with indirect yet tangible implications for the transatlantic balance.

Caption: Just before the U.S. strikes on Iran, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro hosted what was deemed a highly significant meeting in Caracas with Qiu Xiaoqi (also referred to in some reports as Zhu Xiaozhi or similar transliterations), the special envoy of Chinese leader Xi Jinping, to discuss bilateral cooperation.