Drone incursion aftershock: conspiracy theories proliferate in Poland

The drone incursion on 10 Sepember exposed the limits of a flawed security model and laid bare a domestic political split and intensification of anti-Ukraine sentiments and pro-Russian disinformation, writes European Pravda, partner of EUalive in Ukraine.

On the night of 10 September, roughly 20 unmanned aerial vehicles breached Polish airspace – an incursion Warsaw has described as an attack. It marked the first time Polish forces, with allied aviation support, shot down such a mass of drones and the first time the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces publicly defined the episode as an assault on the country. Civilian airports, including Warsaw’s Chopin, were closed for hours, and air-raid sirens sounded in parts of the Lublin Voivodeship.

Militarily, Poland’s response was rapid and effective. Aviation was scrambled, four drones were brought down, and the remainder – reportedly without explosives – were recovered within 48 hours. The armed forces praised Dutch pilots who participated in the interceptions, while France offered three additional Rafale fighters. Poland also reinforced troop posture near the Belarus border amid Zapad 2025 manoeuvres, and Ukrainian experts were welcomed with interest for cheaper, technically relevant counter-drone approaches.

Political leadership in Warsaw projected unity. Prime Minister Donald Tusk said the incident was “not an accident or a mistake” and that he was in constant contact with NATO’s secretary-general to determine the Alliance’s next steps. President Karol Nawrocki, from a different political camp, underlined resolve and restated his pledge to allocate 5% of the budget to defence. An extraordinary UN Security Council meeting took place at Poland’s request, reflecting the gravity attributed to the breach.

Yet beneath the surface of that coordinated state response, serious weaknesses emerged. Crisis communications faltered: the government security centre that routinely sends weather alerts and emergency SMS messages delayed public warnings this time, and many residents in affected voivodeships received “stay home” notices only after they had already left for work. Operationally and rhetorically, questions remain about whether Warsaw’s measured public posture – and its expectation of a robust US or NATO line – will be matched by decisive allied action.

That expectation exposed the limits of what some analysts call Poland’s “security by subscription” model: heavy procurement of US equipment and a dense footprint of allied forces in the hope of eliciting firm American guarantees. In this instance, Washington’s response felt sluggish; a brief presidential social-media post and cautious congressional comments fell short of signalling a clear red-line enforcement.

The attack also laid bare a domestic political split, most visible within the far right. Mainstream parties – PiS and the Civil Coalition – largely echoed the leadership’s condemnation, but the Confederation movement fractured. (The Confederation Liberty and Independence, frequently shortened to Confederation (Konfederacja), is a far-right political alliance in Poland.)

Deputy Speaker Krzysztof Bosak publicly rejected conspiracy theories blaming Ukraine and thanked the security services, while fellow Confederation figure Sławomir Menzen attacked the government’s preparedness and pushed for higher defence spending yet stopped short of naming Russia. Grzegorz Braun’s circle showed even starker ambivalence: two of his MPs abstained and one voted against a parliamentary resolution condemning Moscow. Such ambivalence, critics warn, plays directly into the Kremlin’s hands.

Perhaps the most dangerous aftershock has been a surge of pro-Russian disinformation and an intensification of anti-Ukrainian sentiment. A Res Futura study cited a single-platform finding that 38% of Facebook comments on 10 September blamed Ukraine for the incident (the study does not claim to be a representative poll). Narratives ranged from claims that Kyiv allowed drones to pass to suggestions that Ukraine deliberately provoked Poland – lines that mirror long-standing Kremlin talking points. The volume of such posts, likes and reposts has been compared to the period following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

This disinformation wave overlays an already fraught public debate over refugee benefits and social support for Ukrainians, a discussion that in recent weeks has at times slipped into outright denigration. Measures such as family cash benefits and access to state-funded healthcare for Ukrainian refugees became politicised; President Nawrocki vetoed several continuations at the end of August. The result is a climate in which Ukrainians in Poland report increasing verbal abuse and threats; hate speech is spilling off social media and onto the streets.

Officials have been forced into damage control. Both Tusk and Nawrocki publicly reiterated that the drone incursions were Russian and warned against blaming Kyiv. Yet observers note that prior inflammatory rhetoric – aimed at courting hard-right voters – contributed to the environment in which anti-Ukrainian narratives can flourish. In short, parts of Poland’s political class have sown doubts that Russian disinformation then exploits.

Moscow’s objective appears twofold: to probe NATO’s defensive readiness and to weaponise information to erode public trust in democratic institutions. The military repelled the immediate aerial threat; the broader campaign is less visible and potentially more corrosive. By amplifying conspiracies and stoking xenophobia, Russia seeks to polarise Polish society and weaken the political consensus that has underpinned support for Kyiv.

For Warsaw the strategic imperative is therefore dual: preserve and bolster air-defence capability – including tighter allied coordination and the development of cost-effective counter-UAV tactics – and harden the information space. Responding to disinformation is, in the near term, as urgent as replenishing missile stocks or strengthening radar coverage. Unless both fronts are addressed, tactical success will be hollow: military interceptions can stop drones in mid-flight, but they cannot by themselves restore public trust once that trust is corroded by falsehood.

The 10 September episode will be measured not only by how many UAVs were shot down but by whether Poland and its partners can translate battlefield deterrence into resilient civic defences. If the Alliance leaves the information battlefield unchallenged, the Kremlin’s campaign of erosion will continue to advance long after the last wreckage has been cleared from Polish fields.

The full article in Ukrainian can be found here.

Caption: Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk attends a meeting with air force personnel during a visit to the 32nd Tactical Air Base in Lask, Poland, 11 September 2025. Tusk thanked the pilots a day after the military shot down Russian drones that violated Polish airspace. EPA/MARIAN ZUBRZYCKI