EditDecoding Romanian politics: The enduring legacy of Securitate
Widespread corruption and the perceived “deep state” explain the surprising success of the far-right
When I studied in Romania in the 1970s, I was struck by the immense power of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s Securitate, the secret police. In my home country, Bulgaria, the secret services were influential, but in Romania, they dominated every aspect of life. As a 16-year-old foreigner, fluent in Romanian and well-connected, I sensed I was being monitored. It didn’t trouble me much, but I pitied those who posed as friends while carrying out their grim task of surveillance.
This system fostered a culture of corruption, as Securitate officers and party elites exploited their power for personal gain, controlling resources and opportunities. Then in 1989, everything changed, but unlike in Bulgaria, where the secret services were dismantled, in Romania they largely remained unchanged, as many of my Romanian friends confirm.
The lack of lustration allowed former Securitate officers to transition into the new political, economic, and security elite, perpetuating a system where personal connections and illicit influence trumped merit. Corruption became a defining feature of post-communist Romania, with political parties, businesses, and even judicial institutions entangled in patronage networks.
The National Salvation Front (FSN), led by ex-communist Ion Iliescu, consolidated power post-1989, and many Securitate affiliates found new roles in the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), or private sectors, leveraging old dossiers and networks to maintain influence.
This continuity entrenched a “deep state” perception, where the secret services and their allies in politics and business were seen as manipulating democratic processes. Corruption scandals, from the 1990s privatisation schemes to the 2000s’ judicial bribes, eroded public trust, reinforcing the belief that Romania’s institutions served elites rather than citizens.
By the 2000s, EU accession forced anti-corruption reforms, including the establishment of the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), but these efforts were inconsistent. High-profile convictions, such as that of former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase in 2012, coexisted with accusations that the DNA and SRI selectively targeted political opponents, further blurring the line between justice and political vendettas.
Corruption scandals involving the secret services themselves deepened public cynicism. In 2018, revelations of secret protocols between the SRI, DNA, and judiciary raised concerns about politicised anti-corruption campaigns, with the SRI accused of supplying compromising information to target specific figures. Such scandals reinforced the narrative of a “deep state” manipulating justice for power, not reform.
It is largely this frustration and a perceived “deep state” inherited from the Securitate that explains the surprising success of far-right, pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu, who garnered 23% of the vote in the cancelled first round of the presidential election, despite minimal prior visibility.
But then Securitate – or the deep state – fought back again.
The annulment of the first round of the 2024 presidential election on 6 December 2024, by the Constitutional Court, based on a Supreme Council for National Defence (CSAT) report citing Russian interference, was a seismic event that exposed the interplay of corruption, public discontent, and secret service influence.
To me, as a journalist, the evidence of such interference was thin. Critics, including Georgescu and pro-EU candidate Elena Lasconi, argued the secret services acted to preserve a corrupt status quo threatened by Georgescu’s anti-establishment wave.
Media around the world reported that TikTok had played a pivotal role in channelling discontent, with Georgescu’s campaign leveraging short, emotive videos to reach young and rural voters. A December 2024 snoop.ro investigation revealed that the PNL, a mainstream party, actually funded the TikTok campaign that unintentionally amplified Georgescu’s videos, boosting his visibility. This indicates that his success was also fuelled by public discontent, rather than foreign interference alone, as voters naturally resonated with his anti-establishment message.
In my perception, the Romanian deep state failed miserably in assessing the extent of public discontent. Polls, such as a 2023 Avangarde survey showing 65% of Romanians distrusting state institutions, have offered snapshots but have not been taken seriously.
Now that Romania is a member of the EU and that the geopolitical context is what it is, public discontent has opened a Pandora’s box. It is noteworthy that public discontent in Romania is channeling nostalgia for the Legion, a fascist movement akin to Nazi forces during World War II, and, surprisingly, for Russia, despite its historically adversarial relationship with Romania.
Victor Ponta, a candidate in Romania’s 2025 presidential election rerun, represents a paradoxical blend of establishment continuity (he was prime minister in 2012-15) and populist reformist rhetoric. Ponta now positions himself as a transformative outsider, capitalising on public discontent by aligning with the anti-establishment wave epitomised by Donald Trump. He has highlighted personal connections, such as playing golf with Trump, to burnish his image as a maverick who can challenge Romania’s “deep state” and elite corruption – Trump style.
Later today, Romanians will choose two candidates for the runoff. On 18 May, the deep state will make sure its candidate is elected.
Caption: A couple pass by a billboard displaying electoral posters of candidates for the 2025 presidential elections, in Bucharest, Romania, 2 May 2025. Romanians will vote in the first round of the presidential elections on 4 May 2025. [EPA-EFE/ROBERT GHEMENT]
Updated: May 5, 2025 - 19:32
