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Deciphering Turkey’s efforts in seeking de-escalation in the Israel-Iran clash

Ankara’s offer to mediate in the Israel-Iran is not purely altruistic, but deeply tied to its strategic ambitions 

Georgi Gotev With agencies June 17, 2025 05:53

At a time of escalating tensions in the Middle East, with the Israel-Iran conflict raising global alarm, Turkey has emerged as an important player in advocating for diplomatic mediation to prevent further escalation and spillover.

On 13 June Israel launched strikes on Iranian military and nuclear facilities, killing senior officials, including the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander of the Revolutionary Guards, along with nine nuclear scientists. In retaliation, Iran conducted missile strikes on Israel. These events have heightened fears of a broader regional war, pushing Turkey to take a proactive diplomatic approach.

Ever since, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan have made efforts to promote dialogue, while emphasising nuclear negotiations as the only viable path to resolving the crisis.

Fidan discussed the situation with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, describing the developments as “worrying” and stressed that de-escalation and resolution of Iran’s nuclear program disputes can only be achieved through negotiations.

The Turkish foreign minister’s discussions reflect Turkey’s broader strategy to prevent the conflict from overshadowing the ongoing crisis in Gaza, which Erdoğan has labelled a “genocide”, that must remain in the international spotlight.

Erdoğan has engaged in a flurry of diplomatic outreach, holding talks with the Sultan of Oman, Haitham bin Tariq al Said, the Emir of Kuwait, Mishal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani. According to the Turkish Presidency’s Directorate of Communications, Erdoğan warned that the region cannot withstand another war and urged a coordinated diplomatic response. Additionally, the Emir of Kuwait and the Prime Minister of Iraq shared Turkey’s concerns

The President of Turkey emphasised the importance of maintaining nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, particularly as the sixth phase of these talks faces disruption due to the recent escalation. Erdoğan also cautioned that Israel’s actions risk undermining U.S.-Iran dialogue and could reignite terrorist groups in Iraq, threatening regional stability.

A double-edger sword

For the EU, Turkey’s mediation is a double-edged sword. While its diplomatic outreach aligns with the EU’s call for de-escalation, its independent approach can lead to complications.

Turkey’s offer to mediate in the Israel-Iran are not purely altruistic; they are deeply tied to its strategic ambitions and regional rivalries, particularly with Iran, in shaping the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape, with Syria as a key battleground.

Turkey and Iran have a complex relationship described as a “cooperative rivalry.” While they maintain trade ties and have collaborated in forums like the Astana Process for Syria, their competition for regional dominance is intense, particularly in Syria and Iraq.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, a key Iranian ally, significantly weakened Tehran’s influence in the Levant, shifting the balance toward Turkey, which supports the new Sunni Islamist-led government in Damascus. By mediating, Turkey can indirectly influence Iran’s strategic calculations, ensuring that any de-escalation or nuclear agreement limits Iran’s ability to regain its foothold in Syria or project power through proxies like Hezbollah.

Syria – a critical arena for Turkey-Iran competition

Turkey has invested heavily in supporting Syrian opposition groups, notably Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which led the ouster of Assad. Ankara aims to consolidate a pro-Turkish government in Damascus to secure its southern border, counter Kurdish militias like the YPG (which Turkey views as linked to the PKK), and expand economic and political ties. Iran, conversely, seeks to maintain influence in Syria through remnants of its proxy networks and former Assad loyalists, despite its recent setbacks. Turkey’s mediation efforts could position it to shape post-conflict Syria in ways that marginalize Iran, such as by ensuring a Syrian government hostile to Iranian-backed militias or by limiting Iran’s ability to transfer arms to Hezbollah through Syrian territory.

Turkey’s relations with Israel have been strained, particularly since the Gaza war, but Ankara has avoided severing ties completely, recognising Israel’s strategic importance and its own role as a NATO member. Mediation allows Turkey to engage with Israel constructively, potentially reducing tensions and positioning itself as a key partner for the incoming Trump administration, which prioritises countering Iran. By facilitating dialogue, Turkey can also curry favour with the U.S., which seeks to prevent a broader Iran-Israel conflict and ensure Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons.

The rivalry in Syria is central to Turkey’s mediation motives. Iran’s long-standing support for Assad and its “Axis of Resistance” (including Hezbollah) aimed to create a contiguous corridor from Iran to Lebanon, threatening both Israel and Turkey’s interests. The collapse of Assad’s regime disrupted this corridor, dealing a blow to Iran’s regional strategy.

Turkey, meanwhile, has expanded its influence in northern Syria through military operations and support for opposition groups, aiming to prevent Kurdish autonomy and establish a pro-Turkish order. Iran perceives Turkey’s actions as a threat, particularly Ankara’s backing of Sunni Islamists and its rapprochement with Israel, which Tehran suspects could lead to a joint Turkish-Israeli strategy to squeeze Iran out of Syria.

The Azerbaijan factor

Iran’s large ethnic Azerbaijani population, estimated at 15–20 million (roughly 20–25% of Iran’s population, with more Azeris living in Iran than in Azerbaijan proper), primarily in the northwestern provinces of East and West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan, poses a significant domestic security concern. Turkey’s deepening ties with Azerbaijan, coupled with pan-Turkic rhetoric, stoke Iran’s fears of separatist sentiments among its Azerbaijani minority.

Turkey’s robust support for Azerbaijan, especially during the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, reshaped the South Caucasus’ power dynamics, undermining Iran’s influence. Azerbaijan’s victory, backed by Turkish military technology (e.g., Bayraktar TB2 drones) and diplomatic support, strengthened Baku’s control over Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories, reducing Armenia’s regional clout. Iran, which shares a border with both Azerbaijan and Armenia, has historically sought to maintain friendly ties with Armenia to counterbalance Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Azerbaijan’s close relationship with Israel, a key ally of Turkey, exacerbates Iran’s threat perception. Israel is Azerbaijan’s largest arms supplier, providing advanced weaponry used in the 2020 war, and relies on Azerbaijan for approximately 60% of its oil imports. This partnership aligns with Turkey’s own warming ties with Israel, particularly since 2022, creating a perceived anti-Iran axis.

Iran fears that Turkey and Israel could use Azerbaijan as a staging ground for operations against Iranian interests, including support for anti-regime groups or cyberattacks. The alignment of Turkish and Israeli interests in countering Iran’s regional influence amplifies this threat.

Finally, Turkey’s improved ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, following the resolution of the Qatar diplomatic crisis, contrast with Iran’s strained relations with Gulf monarchies. Mediation allows Turkey to align with Gulf states’ interest in containing Iran, further isolating Tehran diplomatically.

Specific EU comments on Turkey’s mediation efforts are sparse. For EU diplomats, it is beyond doubt that by offering mediation, Turkey is primarily pushing its own agenda.

With IBNA, BGNES, Reuters, edited by g.g.

Caption: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (L) and Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa (R) arrive at a press conference after their meeting at the Presidential Palace in Ankara, Turkey, 04 February 2025. [EPA/NECATI SAVAS]

Updated: June 17, 2025 - 05:53

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