EditCyprus is waiting for Trump involvement
The second half of 2026 could prove decisive in developments on the Cyprus issue
Those monitoring international developments shudder at the idea of Donald Trump getting involved in the Cyprus issue. Those unaware of what’s happening around them, however, just get lost in narrow circles and therefore do not shy away from displaying their enthusiasm about a possible involvement of the US President, writes Dionysis Dionyisiou.
Dionysis Dionyisiou is chief editor of Politis, partner of EUalive.
A few days ago, I was engaged in a discussion over the issue with a Turkish colleague, who follows the Cyprus issue quite closely and is in a position to know at least what is transpiring in Ankara. The current assessment is that the new Christodoulides-Erhürman dialogue does not have a good chance of a substantive result.
“Only a Trump intervention will solve the Cyprus issue,” he told us.
Regardless of expectations from the US President, this doesn’t mean that all parties involved are unhappy with the mere existence of a process. Turkey is just discussing for discussion’s sake, in light of other claims in the wider region, and Cyprus wants to maintain a useful momentum that is usually helpful in three directions.
Firstly, it keeps Turkish tensions low-key; secondly, it provides Christodoulides time to build “ambitious and emblematic alliances,” which he believes will allow him to negotiate the Cyprus issue under better terms; and thirdly, it allows the President time to better handle the internal front on the way to the 2028 presidential elections.
The timeframe
The second half of 2026 is considered by many as a decisive time for developments on the Cyprus issue. With the right political will, the first half of next year might see the conclusion of negotiations, with the final conferences and referenda scheduled for the second half, all under the auspices of the UN.
António Guterres, retiring in 2027, would be absolutely happy if he could facilitate a solution to a long-standing problem such as the Cyprus issue, particularly when the international organisation has been locked out of every other major international issue, such as the Palestinian problem, Syria, Ukraine, and so on.
If the Cyprus issue remains unsolved through to 2027, it’s possible that the leading players and priorities might change, with all established facts gone—namely, what every Cypriot politician calls the “General Assembly, UN Security Council resolutions and EU legislation”.
What changes in the field
Following the Gaza war, the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East regions are witnessing new balances, built in parallel spheres such as energy and connections, security/deterrence, and a reshuffling of diplomatic roles, with Europe—according to the Guardian—politically weaker and the US more agreeable.
What do we see:
- Energy is being forged as a catalyst for alliances—for example, the Israel-Egypt deal for the sale of natural gas from the Leviathan deposit until 2040 strengthens, according to the Financial Times, the role of Egypt as an LNG export hub and ties in Israel with neighbouring states through long-term trade agreements.
- Electrical connections being considered geopolitical infrastructure: The EU is promoting the Great Sea Interconnector as a critical work breaking the island’s energy isolation as the last member state outside the European network and turns Cyprus—even though the government, depending on local players, does not really see it—from a consumer to a regional architecture hub.•
Minilateral security alliances are being forged: The logic of small alliances, like three-plus-one, is being strengthened, pertaining to maritime security and anti-terrorism (USA-Israel-Greece-Cyprus). But they could be more effective if Turkey was taking part.
The basic players
The US wants to provide a security umbrella in the Eastern Mediterranean and a substantial contribution in building a new trade architecture guided by President-businessman Trump. The US can work as a deal accelerator—in energy deals, for example—as well as a guarantor of deterrence. But it often seeks financial trade-offs.
The EU is operating in the area as both a coordinator and a financier in the energy market, but it’s finding it difficult to speak with a single political voice over the Middle East. EU power is derived through network projects, such as connections or energy highways, as well as market regulations. Cyprus is in a critical area and its connection through Greece is fast becoming a European priority. It’s doubtful, though, if this is understood by its leadership, which has been manipulated by local interests.
Turkey, having a revisionist role, is trying to gain additional brownie points through a series of claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, its strategy being not to stay out of energy and security designs. It’s practically attempting to impose that nothing—including exclusive economic zone rights, cables, or pipelines—can go through the region without its final say-so. It also wants to become an energy hub towards Europe; bad relations, however, with Greece and the pending Cyprus issue are limiting this ambition, as it is usually excluded from energy alliances, such as the EMGF.
Israel now, through military power, technology, and energy deposits, has gained a significant regional influence. It has already locked in energy exports and infrastructures with neighbouring countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, like Greece and Cyprus. Its main competitor is Turkey, with some communication over a number of issues, including Syria, but also suspicious of each other and competing for the leading role.
The Trump role
What could Cyprus gain through the reshuffling of balances in the region? However small, it is gaining geostrategic value over the past few years as an EU member in the Eastern Mediterranean, as a gateway/network hub and a platform for security cooperation.
Cyprus could benefit even more by a settlement of the Cyprus issue, as it would include the 100-million-strong Turkish market in the equation, beyond Greece, Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon.
The passage of time and the possible Donald Trump involvement in the region might leave everyone unhappy.
In today’s conditions, Cyprus can take part in the geopolitical reformation of the area as a small but credible player, a catalyst for the political and economic cooperation of all regional states, as an honest broker.
Developments and the rearrangement of balances in the region, without a settlement of the Cyprus issue, make the country part of the problem—or as the US ambassador in Ankara Tom Barak put it, “an abscess.”
No one wants Trump to clean this abscess. According to a Thomas B. Edsall article in the New York Times last week, “Trump’s political behaviour and mentality are not complex but built around raw narcissism and a clearly egocentric view of power. The central axis of his administration is personal interest, image and both himself and his family becoming richer at the expense of public interest and institutions.”
Within such a framework, Cyprus is in danger of being considered as collateral damage in a wider give-and-take setting with Turkey, which might be catastrophic for both communities in Cyprus.
The original version if this opinion article can be found here.
Caption: Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides (L) and US President Donald Trump pose during the greetings ceremony before the family picture at the Gaza Peace Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, 13 October 2025. EPA/YOAN VALAT / POOL
Updated: December 22, 2025 - 10:30
