EditCFSP: the veto may disappear, the asymmetry will not
The deeper problem is that the European Union is not a politically or economically homogeneous space
The problem with the EU’s foreign-policy decision making process is real, but the veto is a symptom of a deeper problem. The EU has integrated its member states politically without eliminating the structural asymmetries that shape their foreign-policy interests and bargaining power. Replacing unanimity with flexibility may make decisions faster, but it does not necessarily make European foreign policy more genuinely common, writes Jan Muś.
Jan Muś is the author of the Political Risk Monitor and an analyst specialising in Central and South-Eastern Europe and European integration.
The latest call by eleven EU member states to reduce the ability of individual governments to block Common Foreign and Security Policy decisions has once again brought the issue of unanimity to the centre of the European debate. The argument is a familiar one: in a more dangerous international environment, Europe cannot afford to spend weeks negotiating a common position, only to discover that one government can prevent the EU from acting.
The deeper problem is that the European Union is not a politically or economically homogeneous space. Various member states occupy different structural positions within the European political economy system. Some holds the high-tech and high-value end of the stick while some others provide cheap components and equally cheap labour. These positions produce different social and political balances, different economic dependencies and therefore different foreign policy preferences. Removing unanimity may increase efficiency, but it cannot eliminate conflicts generated by asymmetric integration.
In other words, European states do not enter the foreign-policy bargaining process from the same structural position. But easier decision-making is not necessarily the same as greater strategic cohesion. The governments that disagree with a particular policy would simply have to find other ways of defending their interests: building coalitions, influencing negotiations before a vote, shaping the agenda or seeking concessions elsewhere.
And this is where the political economy of European integration becomes important.
Some European economies control significant amounts of capital and technology and occupy high positions in European and global production networks. Others remain more dependent on foreign investment, external markets, particular energy suppliers or foreign-owned production. A country’s economic structure does not tell us automatically whether its government will support or oppose a particular EU position. But economic structures change the costs of foreign-policy choices.
A government whose economy is highly exposed to a particular external market may face different domestic consequences from sanctions than a government with a more diversified economy. A country dependent on particular energy supplies may calculate the risks of confrontation differently from one with greater energy autonomy. A state with substantial domestic technological and financial resources has greater room to absorb economic retaliation than a smaller economy heavily integrated into foreign-owned production networks.
The same logic deserves to be applied to foreign policy.
From veto power to structural power
This leads to an important distinction that is largely missing from the current debate: the difference between veto power and structural power. Veto power is easy to see. A government either can or cannot prevent a decision. Structural power is more subtle. It concerns the ability to influence what is discussed, which alternatives are considered realistic, which coalitions emerge and what compromises governments are willing to accept.
Unanimity gives smaller states an unusually powerful form of formal protection: one government can stop the entire Union. But once the veto is weakened, the importance of structural power increases. A country that cannot block a decision independently must build coalitions. It must persuade other governments. It needs diplomatic capacity, political networks and the ability to offer or demand concessions.
Not all member states possess these resources to the same degree. This creates a paradox. Moving from unanimity to greater flexibility may make the EU more capable of taking decisions while simultaneously making differences in political influence more important. The question is therefore not simply whether Europe should abandon the veto. It is what kind of power structure would replace it.
Flexibility can be part of the solution – but not the whole solution
The current geopolitical environment makes a more flexible EU foreign-policy system increasingly necessary. The Union needs to be capable of acting when a common strategic objective has already been established but one government is unwilling to participate. Constructive abstention can be useful here. So can carefully designed forms of qualified majority voting and coalitions of willing member states. But flexibility should not be confused with equality. If the EU moves towards more flexible decision-making, it should also pay greater attention to the unequal capacities of its member states to participate in that process. Energy security, industrial capacity, technological dependence, control over capital and the position of national economies in European value chains all affect the ability of governments to pursue independent strategic choices.
Caption: Informal meeting of European Affairs Ministers – 4 September 2026 [Council Newsroom]
Updated: September 7, 2026 - 11:15
