EditBillions for Ukraine: how the EU can turn aid into strengthening democracy
Ukraine’s victory will not be measured only at the front, but in the institutions that remain once the fighting ends
Without citizen pressure, without Brussels making its voice heard, an essential pillar of Ukraine’s resilience could have been dismantled last July when parliament approved legislation weakening the independence of anti-corruption bodies, writes Oleksandr Iakymenko.
Oleksandr Iakymenko is Ukraine and Moldova Programme Coordinator at Democracy Reporting International
As the European Union debates how best to sustain Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction, one question sits at the centre of the conversation: how can it make sure that its support strengthens Ukraine’s democracy (a system under martial law with evolving anti-corruption reforms) rather than weaken it?
The level of support is unprecedented, the stakes even more so. On 22 August, the European Union disbursed another €4.05 billion to Kyiv, including €3.05 billion from the Ukraine Facility and €1 billion in exceptional macro-financial assistance. That brought total Facility transfers since March 2024 to €22.7 billion.
Add in €72 billion in military commitments, plus other aid lines, and Team Europe has now mobilised around €150 billion since 2022. This is unprecedented solidarity. It is also an unprecedented risk. What guarantee exists that this support will strengthen Ukraine and not erode in the same governance failures that once plagued its politics?
The episode in late July is a warning. On the 22nd, parliament approved legislation weakening the independence of NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and SAPO (Special Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office), Ukraine’s two main anti-corruption institutions. Human Rights Watch sounded the alarm. Citizens staged demonstrations. Brussels intervened directly, as President Ursula von der Leyen phoned President Zelenskyy to express concern. The EU publicly urged Kyiv to reverse course.
Within days, the parliament complied. On 31 July, independence was restored. Forty-eight hours later, the revived institutions (NABU and SAPO) uncovered a corruption scheme in defence procurement. The sequence speaks volumes. Without citizen pressure, without Brussels making its voice heard, an essential pillar of Ukraine’s resilience would have been dismantled. It also showed what is possible when institutions remain empowered: anti-corruption bodies moved immediately against abuse in military contracts.
For the EU, this means leverage is not theoretical. It works when applied consistently. The problem is that interventions often appear ad hoc, erupting in crisis and then fading again.
Transparency International Ukraine’s legal analysis warned that similar provisions could yet resurface. Europe must understand this as a chronic challenge. Conditionality cannot rest on emergency calls alone. It must be embedded in the structure of aid. Here is what that would look like in practice:
- Guarantee the legal independence of NABU and SAPO in EUUkraine agreements, with automatic safeguard clauses if autonomy is diluted.
- Require transparent e-procurement for non-sensitive defence items, with narrow exceptions subject to later review, and provide EU assistance to help create joint monitoring units with the Ministry of Defence.
- Fund watchdogs, regional NGOs and investigative reporters, not via government channels but through flexible multi-year programmes. They are the early warning system.
- Ensure parliamentary committees and courts are equipped to function with EU-sponsored expertise and open hearings even under wartime rules.
- Begin preparing now for credible post-war elections, including voter roll protection and secure participation for displaced citizens.
None of this is about punishment. Conditionality is risksharing. The EU is investing at a historic scale in a war economy. Guardrails are not a brake on solidarity; they are how solidarity delivers results. Nor should conditionality be confused with micromanagement.
July’s protests showed that Ukrainians themselves demand clean government. The EU’s role is to strengthen, not substitute for, that demand. External support should reinforce democratic institutions that are already struggling to survive under martial law.
The alternative is not hypothetical. Europe knows it well: wars where billions were poured in, battles were won, but states collapsed afterwards as corruption hollowed out institutions. That outcome would betray Ukraine, undermine European taxpayers, and destabilise Europe’s future security.
Ukraine has already shown resilience. Institutions can correct course under pressure. Civil society is mobilised. The EU should take confidence in that, and lock in protections now. Because in the end, victory will not be measured only at the front. It will be measured in the institutions that remain once the fighting ends.
Caption: Ukrainian people attend a protest against the restriction of the autonomy of Ukrainian anti-corruption authorities in Kyiv, Ukraine, 30 July 2025. EPA/SERGEY DOLZHENKO
Updated: September 22, 2025 - 05:38
