EditAnkara navigates growing domestic pressure as crises begin to overlap
From economic fragility to eroded trust in the justice system and the media, multiple fault lines reshape Turkey’s political landscape
Turkey’s political system is no longer dealing with crises sequentially. Economic pressure, social tension and institutional strain are beginning to overlap, forcing the government into a tighter and more complex operating space where multiple pressure points converge at once.
Issues that were previously managed separately – labour disputes, judicial processes, Kurdish negotiations, economic credibility, foreign policy alignment and opposition pressure – are now crowding the same political arena. The result is not immediate instability, but a denser and more compressed governance environment in which tensions increasingly interact.
A recent hunger strike by workers at Doruk Mining, a private mining company in Turkey, over unpaid wages, illustrates how economic stress is becoming more visible and politically charged. The dispute goes beyond unpaid wages, exposing a broader governance pattern in which the state appears highly effective in containing protest, yet less active in enforcing obligations on private capital. The miners’ march towards Ankara and subsequent police intervention underline the social underside of Turkey’s economic model, marked by privatisation, weak labour protections and growing precarity. While this does not signal widespread disorder, it reflects a labour environment where grievances can quickly take on political meaning.
At the same time, the reopening of the Gülistan Doku case, a long-unsolved disappearance from 2020, points to a different dynamic: selective judicial activation. The system demonstrates its capacity to act, particularly in high-visibility cases, but also reinforces that such action is conditional. Not all cases move forward; some do so at politically opportune moments. This contributes to a broader perception of conditional legality, where the judiciary remains a powerful tool but its timing and scope are increasingly shaped by political considerations.
This legal environment is also visible in mounting pressure on opposition structures, particularly municipalities linked to the CHP (Republican People’s Party), Turkey’s main opposition party. Corruption investigations, legal disputes surrounding the party’s leadership congress and symbolic confrontations between opposition figures and the government form part of an ongoing legitimacy struggle. These developments are less about isolated legal actions and more about a sustained contest over political credibility.
The Kurdish process remains active in rhetoric but largely stalled in practice. Official messaging continues to emphasise continuity and control, yet fundamental disagreements – such as whether disarmament should precede legal reforms or vice versa – remain unresolved. The government faces a narrow corridor: keeping the process open enough to maintain political flexibility, while avoiding backlash from nationalist constituencies. The result is a managed limbo, where the process persists without clear forward movement.
Economic pressure is becoming increasingly politically salient. Inflation, business failures and declining purchasing power are now accompanied by visible concerns within circles close to the government about the sustainability of current policies. Criticism has shifted from purely opposition voices to a broader spectrum. The central issue is increasingly described as short-termism: policies designed to stabilise immediate conditions rather than restore long-term coherence.
Tight monetary policy may support macroeconomic credibility, but it also compresses production, consumption and social resilience. This creates a widening gap between official narratives of stabilisation and the lived experience of households and businesses. While the investment environment remains functional, the overall policy corridor is narrowing, and economic management is becoming more sensitive to political developments and potential market reactions.
Relations with the European Union have also entered a more explicitly geopolitical phase. Recent remarks suggesting that Europe should avoid falling under the influence of powers such as Turkey have been interpreted in Ankara as a sign of structural reclassification. Pro-government voices present this as recognition of Turkey’s strategic weight, while critics see it as evidence that the country is no longer viewed as a candidate for integration, but rather through a framework of containment.
At the same time, internal divisions within the EU persist, with some European figures continuing to advocate for pragmatic engagement in areas such as migration, security and energy. This results in a dual-track relationship: functional cooperation alongside growing political distance. For Turkey, this ambiguity both constrains and enables, limiting prospects for deeper integration while allowing room for strategic repositioning.
In this shifting landscape, the United Kingdom has emerged as a more flexible partner. Free from the institutional constraints of the EU, post-Brexit Britain offers a more transactional framework for cooperation. Bilateral ties are deepening in trade, defence and technology, providing Turkey with an alternative channel that preserves Western connectivity without requiring political convergence.
Turkey continues to leverage its geopolitical position as a corridor, mediator and military actor. However, external projection increasingly intersects with internal constraints. Rising energy costs, inflationary pressures and broader economic fragility translate global developments into domestic strain. Controversial diplomatic messaging from international actors has further complicated domestic narratives, at times reinforcing the government’s model while also exposing it to criticism over legitimacy and sovereignty.
Survey signals deep institutional trust crisis
Public confidence in Turkey’s judicial system has fallen to 36%, while half of respondents say they do not trust the courts, according to a March 2026 survey that highlights a broader crisis of trust in state institutions.
The poll, conducted by the Istanbul-based Gündemar centre between 23 and 26 March among 2,200 respondents across 60 provinces, shows that 50% of participants express distrust in the judiciary – the highest level recorded for any institution in the survey. Trust stands at 36%, with 11% undecided and 3% expressing no opinion.
The judiciary is the only institution where distrust exceeds 50%, suggesting that scepticism has moved beyond political polarisation and reflects a deeper erosion of confidence. Other institutions linked to democratic oversight also record low trust levels. Media outlets register just 24% trust against 53% distrust, while parliament is almost evenly split at 41% trust and 42% distrust. The presidency records 42% trust versus 44% distrust.
Public attitudes towards municipalities are similarly divided at 38% trust and 38% distrust. Confidence in the political opposition remains limited, with 31% expressing trust and 43% distrust, indicating a wider crisis of representation across the political spectrum.
Universities perform comparatively better, with 49% trust and 27% distrust, although concerns about academic independence persist. By contrast, security institutions enjoy significantly higher levels of confidence, with the police at 69% and the armed forces at 73%, the highest among all institutions.
When asked about the country’s most pressing problem, respondents overwhelmingly point to economic concerns such as inflation and unemployment, cited by 50.33%. Issues related to law, justice and judicial independence follow at 18.26%, reinforcing the link between declining institutional trust and broader governance challenges.
The findings come amid continued criticism from political figures and legal experts regarding the state of the judiciary and the broader presidential system introduced after the 2017 referendum, which expanded executive powers and, according to critics, weakened checks and balances.
The full article of EUalive’s partner LevantIntel can be found here. With additional information from BGNES, also an EUalive’s partner.
Updated: April 27, 2026 - 08:16
