Analysis: For Romania’s political class, even the appearance of reform is intolerable

In a country where democratic will expressed at the ballot box seems increasingly ornamental, the real winners may once again be the entrenched networks that have long captured the state, writes Adrian Mihălțianu, Publisher of EUalive’s partner PressOne.

Romania’s parliament has just passed a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan’s government. The vote’s scale and the political realignments it exposes offer a stark lesson: large segments of the Romanian political class – and the electorate that sustains it – recoil from even the mildest attempts at reform.

Romania’s parliament ousts pro-EU minority government in no-confidence vote

Here are five immediate takeaways.

1.The political centre of gravity is firmly populist and anti-reform

The strong parliamentary majority that ousted Bolojan signals more than a tactical alliance. It reveals where real power lies in Romania today: populist-nationalist forces (led by AUR) combined with like-minded factions inside nominally pro-European parties such as the PSD far outweigh the small pro-reform, pro-accountability blocs.

A formal AUR-PSD alliance was not necessary. The motion’s real goals were narrower: removing a prime minister who had dared attempt even timid reforms, and bringing the Liberal Party (PNL) back into line after it showed signs of uncomfortable independence

2.Hopes for a genuine split in the PNL are probably wishful thinking

Many observers are quietly hoping Ilie Bolojan will lead a reformist faction out of the PNL, perhaps absorbing parts of the USR to create a credible centre-right, genuinely pro-European pole. This scenario faces two major obstacles.

First, Bolojan has shown no inclination to leave the party – either before or after the motion. When the “mafia-style” faction that has long dominated the PNL eventually removes him (and it likely will), he may prefer to retreat to a power base he can control rather than fight for a new political project in Bucharest.

Second, the costs of defection are enormous for most PNL figures – mayors, MPs, local barons, and those embedded in state companies and institutions. These actors have a deep aversion to risk. Challenging the security services and the entrenched interests that reasserted control over the party would require a backbone rarely seen in Romanian politics. A real split therefore looks unlikely; internal power struggles within what is often called “PSD-light” are more probable.

3.USR faces a painful dilemma

The centre-right USR has repeatedly pledged it will not govern with the PSD again. If it breaks that promise to secure ministerial posts in a new PSD-led government, it can cling to the illusion of incremental reform. If it stays true to its word, it must find a way to grow by attracting disillusioned voters – the 3-4 percentage points it might gain from the PNL will not be enough.

Crucially, USR currently lacks a credible prime-ministerial figure. Hoping that adopting Bolojan will magically solve this problem may prove naive. (The ethnic Hungarian party UDMR, for its part, has no incentive to leave government voluntarily.)

4.PSD is winning – but its leader must now show courage

PSD has emerged triumphant for now. Yet if Sorin Grindeanu does not immediately step forward as prime minister, it will confirm perceptions of deep cowardice. The party had little patience with Bolojan; the moment has come for it to build a new majority around its own leadership rather than hiding behind another PNL figure or a “technocrat.”

Any hesitation suggests that even PSD functions as a tool for those who want to preserve the status quo, with political leaders serving merely as disposable pawns.

5.AUR is the biggest winner

AUR delivered for its voters and showed it can subordinate itself to PSD when asked – despite now being larger. Its supporters are unlikely to view cooperation with the old PSD establishment as contamination. On the contrary, the party has burnished its anti-system credentials while advancing the interests of the very networks it claims to oppose.

The deeper meaning: reform is anathema

The transparent masks have finally fallen. PSD has chosen to protect entrenched mafia-style interests over any pressure from Brussels. AUR, originally created to launder PSD’s image in Europe by capturing its more radical voters, has fulfilled its intended role.

Romania now appears headed for a “stable” government that prioritises continuity over change. The bill for this approach – economic, social, and European – will be steep. Even the appearance of reform has proven intolerable. In a country where democratic will expressed at the ballot box seems increasingly ornamental, the real winners may once again be the entrenched networks that have long captured the state.

Whether this arrangement can deliver genuine prosperity and deeper Euro-Atlantic integration without meaningful reform remains one of the more optimistic – and untested – bets in contemporary Romanian politics.

The original of this opinion piece in Romanian can be found here.

Caption: Two parliament workers leave the chamber carrying ballot boxes containing votes cast for the motion of no confidence against the Bolojan cabinet during a plenary session of the Parliament in Bucharest, Romania, 5 May 2026. The motion against the Bolojan Cabinet passed with 281 votes in favor, 4 against and 3 annulled, resulting in the government being dismissed by a motion of censure. Following the vote, the government will remain interim until a new cabinet is formed. EPA/Robert Ghement

• captured state
• far right
• political crisis
• Romania

Updated: May 6, 2026 - 15:45