Analysis: Ankara charts the big routes, Sofia seeks the small money

In just three months, Rumen Radev’s government has elevated relations with Ankara to a top priority. Behind the language of connectivity, however, lie asymmetric deals.

Three months after former president Rumen Radev took power, Turkey has emerged as Bulgaria’s preferred partner for building new transport and energy links that would give Ankara better access to Europe.

“The future of our region will increasingly be shaped by connectivity between Bulgaria and Turkey,” Radev declared after yet another meeting with Turkish Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu in August. The new partnership, though, rests on an old and unfavourable commitment – the 13-year agreement between Bulgargaz and Turkey’s state company Botaş, signed in 2023 by a caretaker government appointed by Radev himself. That deal obliges Bulgaria to pay for unused capacity, has already accumulated more than $360 million in unpaid liabilities, and is now being renegotiated under unclear terms.

Regarding the protocol with Botaş, the government prefers to speak of “expanding cooperation.” In this framing, the agreement no longer looks like an energy failure but the starting point of a much broader rapprochement.

“The control valve”

“If for Ankara the Bulgargaz–Botaş contract is a strategic success and a tool for expanding its influence, from the perspective of Bulgarian interests it is a questionable project that will place the country under long-term financial strain and create a disproportionate dependency,” Mehmed Yumer, a journalist and analyst of Turkish politics, told EUalive.net. “Ankara is pursuing a pragmatic geopolitical strategy of influence by leveraging its infrastructure. As a key transit hub, Turkey is becoming the gateway for gas supplies to the Balkans. In their effort to move away from Russian gas, countries such as Bulgaria remain logistically tied to Turkish pipelines and LNG terminals.”

Yumer notes that Turkey’s Balkan strategy rests on several rational pillars: energy, the defence industry, balanced diplomacy and financial investment. “In short, the battle is over who will hold the control valve linking Asia and Europe. On one side the EU is trying to consolidate its external border as an institutional shield; on the other, Turkey seeks to turn it into a highway that strengthens its logistical power,” he concludes.

Between 22 May and 13 August alone, representatives of the two governments held at least ten separate meetings and talks. In Sofia and Ankara they discussed natural gas supplies and routes, oil and gas exploration in the Black Sea, new railway and road links, border crossings, logistics centres, migration and security.

Ankara’s strategy

Ankara enters these talks with a comprehensive strategy. It wants to channel Chinese cargo via the Middle Corridor, flows from Iraq along the Development Road, and energy arriving in Turkey from various sources onward to Europe. Bulgaria enters with projects worth hundreds of millions of euros but without secured funding, hoping Brussels will cover most of the bill after 2028.

The Turkish side makes no secret of the strategic intent. After talks in Sofia, Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu stated that the Middle Corridor from the Far East, the Development Road from Iraq and the future railway from Saudi Arabia should not end in Turkey but continue toward Europe. “We agree that our most important partner in this regard is Bulgaria,” Uraloğlu told the state-run Anadolu Agency.

In a separate statement he specified what this European outlet requires: a second railway connection between the two countries and the doubling of sections of the Plovdiv–Svilengrad–Turkish border line. The aim, he said, is for transport links to make “a greater contribution to trade and transport between Europe and Asia.”

The Turkish formula is similar in energy. After the new protocol between Botaş and Bulgargaz was signed, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar announced that the two sides had reaffirmed their shared will for “the development and more efficient use of natural gas transmission capacity.” In his view the document would make an important contribution not only to the two countries but also to “the energy stability of the region.”

An asymmetric approach

Behind the language of “regional stability,” however, lies a clear asymmetry. Turkey controls the cargo and energy flows and determines their routes toward Europe. Bulgaria must provide the railway infrastructure on its territory and find the financing.

The two railway projects alone that are meant to increase Bulgaria’s capacity toward Turkey are estimated at around €877 million, according to a response from the Bulgarian Ministry of Transport and Communications to EUalive.net.

The new 71-kilometre Yambol–Elhovo–Lesovo–Turkish border line is expected to cost approximately €547.1 million, while doubling the existing route toward Turkey would add another €330 million.

The second project covers almost all single-track sections from Krumovo to the Turkish border (Krumovo–Katunitsa, Popovitsa–Parvomay, Parvomay–Karadzhalovo, Karadzhalovo–Yabalkovo, Yabalkovo–Dimitrovgrad, Dimitrovgrad–Nova Nadezhda, Nova Nadezhda–Simeonovgrad, Simeonovgrad–Harmanli, Harmanli–Lyubimets, Lyubimets–Svilengrad and Svilengrad–Turkish border). The Katunitsa–Popovitsa section is already double-tracked.

Neither the new line via Lesovo nor the doubling of the route to the Turkish border has full funding secured. The government intends to apply for both projects under the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework for 2028–2034, the Transport Ministry said.

The only concrete project proposal currently being prepared for European funding is for €40 million (excluding VAT) and covers the Lyubimets–Svilengrad–Greek border section — not the continuation toward Turkey. Bulgaria will apply jointly with Romania and Greece under the CEF Reflow procedure within the Baltic Sea–Black Sea–Aegean Sea corridor. EU co-financing can reach 85%.

The Transport Ministry’s response also raises questions about the economic viability of the Lesovo project. The cost-benefit analysis deems it economically justified but notes a “high investment cost relative to projected traffic.”

The ministry confirms that at the 13 August meeting between ministers Georgi Peev and Abdulkadir Uraloğlu “no document was signed and no new commitments were undertaken.” Thus the “acceleration” of connectivity announced by both governments currently amounts to a political declaration and the re-presentation of projects agreed or started earlier. The Yambol–Elhovo–Lesovo–Turkish border line was already envisaged in a memorandum signed in 2023.

The future route is meant to restore and modernise the 39-kilometre Yambol–Elhovo line and extend it with 32 kilometres of entirely new construction via Lesovo to the Turkish border, including a new border station. This would give Turkey a second railway route into the EU capable of taking part of the growing freight traffic and reducing dependence on the overloaded Svilengrad–Kapıkule connection.

The pre-investment study has already been completed. The National Railway Infrastructure Company has chosen the construction of a 71-kilometre single-track electrified line with a design speed of 160 km/h for passenger trains and 120 km/h for freight trains. Three stations and six stops are planned along the route, including the new Lesovo border station. The study results were handed over to the Turkish state railway company TCDD on 1 September 2025.

Responsibilities were allocated the same year: NRIC is to build the line from Yambol to Lesovo, while TCDD will construct the continuation from the border to Edirne. It remains unclear, however, who will finance the new railway border crossing and under what conditions.

The European gateway for Turkish energy

In the energy sector, Bulgaria, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia are preparing a roadmap for a Green Energy Corridor that would carry electricity from the Caspian region through Turkey to the European market. Ankara calls it “the electricity version of TANAP” and states that the power will first reach the Turkish market and from there continue to Europe. Bulgaria and Turkey are already linked by two 400 kV power lines, and the Electricity System Operator plans two more, but there is no information that construction has begun, nor have costs or funding been announced.

In parallel, the two countries declare their intention to make more efficient use of the existing gas capacity through Strandzha–Malkoclar. Turkey’s state company TPAO has acquired a 33% stake in exploration rights in Bulgaria’s Black Sea “Khan Tervel” block, where it will partner with Shell and OMV.

Ankara defines the flows and charts the routes; Sofia provides the European entrance and waits for Brussels to pay for the infrastructure. In this “strategic partnership,” Turkey holds the control valve — Bulgaria is still looking for someone to pay for the pipes and the rails.

Caption: Prime Minister Rumen Radev meets with the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure of the Republic of Turkey, Abdulkadir Uraloğlu, on 13 August 2026. [Council of Ministers Press Service]