EditA weakened Iran leaves Turkey as the regional hegemon
Among the conclusions Ankara is drawing from this experience is whether the country should acquire nuclear weapons
For Turkey’s political leadership and public opinion, Israel bears the main responsibility for the Iran war, writes Günter Seufert.
Günter Seufert is the former Founding Director of the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. He wrote this op-ed in personal capacity.
There is no reason not to believe Turkey when it says it wanted to prevent a war between Israel and the US against Iran at all costs. Already during Israel’s twelve-day bombardment of Iran last June, Ankara pressed for an immediate end to the attacks. Well before the current war, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan sought to convince Washington that a military conflict would ultimately damage the aggressors more than it would benefit them. Yet despite all the current adversities, Turkey may in the end stand to gain from this war.
For now, Turkey is suffering in many respects. Like the rest of the world, the country – which possesses no significant fossil fuel resources of its own – is struggling with rising oil and gas prices. These increases are pushing the already soaring inflation rate of around 30 per cent even higher. The US air defence system that protects Turkish airspace on NATO’s behalf has already intercepted three Iranian missiles, all over the south of the country, not far from Antalya, the hub of Turkey’s mass tourism industry. This does not bode well for the coming season.
The greatest concern, however, is the uncertain future of Iran. Turkey has never succumbed to the notion of a controllable regime change in Tehran, an idea entertained at the start of the war by policymakers in Tel Aviv and Washington and by credulous politicians in Brussels and Berlin. With Iraq and Syria, Ankara has already witnessed the collapse of two neighbouring states, triggered in part by Western interventions. The consequences were state failure, warlordism, religious radicalisation, refugee flows and ethnic conflict. What would this mean for Iran, where Persians account for only around sixty per cent of the population? In the event of regime collapse, what will bind together the Kurds in the west, the Azeris in the north and the Baluchis in the south of the country?
Ankara is particularly concerned that a weakening of Iran’s central government could provide a political opening for the country’s Kurds. Since the protests of 2022, Tehran’s political and cultural repression in Iranian Kurdistan has once again intensified. In recent years, the region has been one of the centres of protest and, together with Baluchistan, has recorded the highest number of casualties. In February 2026, six Iranian-Kurdish parties – ranging from PJAK, an offshoot of the PKK, to the social-democratic Komalah – agreed to closer cooperation and were on the verge of being enlisted by the United States as ground forces.
At present, only a small number of people are fleeing Iran. Should the country descend into civil war, this will change quickly. Ankara is unlikely to repeat the open-border policy it pursued at the start of the Syrian civil war. Of the 560-kilometre-long border with Iran, 380 kilometres were fortified with a concrete wall years ago. A trench runs along almost the entire border, and hundreds of watchtowers equipped with modern surveillance technology are intended to prevent irregular refugee movements. Plans for the establishment of a buffer zone on Iranian territory were already presented at the end of January in a closed-door briefing by the Turkish Foreign Ministry for members of parliament. Yet if push comes to shove, will the government in Ankara also turn away Turkish-speaking Azeris? After all, it routinely describes Turks and Azeris as two parts of a single nation who live in different states solely as a result of historical contingencies.
In his handling of this war so far, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is once again demonstrating his mastery of political manoeuvre. On the one hand, he has expressed his condolences to the Iranian people on the death of Ali Khamenei, the religious leader and most powerful figure in Iran, thereby echoing the sentiments of much of the Turkish public. At the same time, he carefully avoids any criticism of US President Donald Trump and his policies. Statements such as those made by German Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier – that the war violates international law – are not heard from Ankara.
For Turkey’s political leadership and public opinion, Israel bears the main responsibility for this war. Whether pro-government or opposition-leaning, the press reports extensively and approvingly on the statements of Joe Kent, Director of the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The NCTC coordinates counterterrorism efforts across the 18 US intelligence agencies, and Kent was appointed by Trump himself. Kent has stated that there is no evidence whatsoever that Iran intended to attack the United States. He further suggests that Trump went to war under the influence of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a claim that has earned him accusations of antisemitism. The Turkish press also relishes quoting a remark by Democratic Senator Chris Van Hollen, who said that Netanyahu had been waiting for decades for a US president willing to join him in attacking Iran. In Donald Trump, the Israeli prime minister has now found someone “stupid enough to do so”.
The more the Turkish government concentrates its fire on Israel and Netanyahu, the less its supporters ask why it refrains from criticising Donald Trump. But even if Ankara does not attack the United States rhetorically, behind the scenes trust in Washington has evaporated. The massive damage suffered by the Gulf states has demonstrated that the protection they had expected from the US is riddled with holes and fundamentally fragile. Ankara is drawing at least three conclusions from this experience. First, it is making its own missile defence system a top priority. Second, an internal debate has begun over whether Turkey should acquire nuclear weapons. Third, Ankara is seeking security partners within its own region. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and nuclear-armed Pakistan signed a mutual defence pact, and Turkey is considering joining it. At the same time, Ankara is significantly expanding its military and defence cooperation with the Gulf states. By the end of the war, Iran will be weakened. The United States will have lost its status as the sole dominant power. Israel will likely emerge militarily victorious but will be regarded with deep mistrust by the region’s states. That leaves the region with Turkey.
Caption: Protesters set fire to a banner showing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a protest against US-Israeli attacks on Iran, in Istanbul, Turkey, 1 March 2026. Iran officially confirmed on 1 March that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in a joint US-Israeli military operation conducted on 28 February 2026. EPA/ERDEM SAHIN
Updated: March 26, 2026 - 07:14
