Edit26 October could be the most dangerous day in Serbia’s recent political history
Between high hopes for the student list and growing repression, Serbia heads into an election whose real test may come not on 25 October, but on the morning after
After the upcoming 25 October general election, Serbia will certainly not be the same, but the question is whether it will be a better or worse place to live. A considerable number of citizens have high expectations for the elections, believing that the university students’ ticket will triumph. They base their hope on the fact that the student movement has managed to cover all polling stations with election monitors – the first time an opposition ticket has done so since Aleksandar Vučić came to power. The question, nevertheless, is whether that will be enough to prevent manipulation.
The end of the campaign
On the last day of the campaign, 22 October, ahead of the election silence, the two main rivals – Vučić’s coalition and the student movement – will hold rallies in Belgrade. Vučić will speak at a sports hall in New Belgrade, while the students will gather in Slavija Square, where they have already held several mass protests with more than 100,000 participants. If an extremely large number of people attend, the student gathering could add wind to the sails of their election ticket. With a mass rally the students would send a positive message to all opponents of the regime and motivate them to turn out to vote.
Vučić’s objective is to demonstrate strength to his voters, who will be informed about the Serbian Progressive Party rally via pro-government media and social networks. The campaign has not particularly gained momentum near the end; rather, it has maintained roughly the same intensity throughout and boiled down to the two strongest options. While Vučić dominated the Progressives’ campaign as practically the only prominent face, the student ticket did not offer even a first among equals, but rather 250 people, mostly unknown to the public yet accomplished and recognised in their respective professions. Still, they are predominantly political amateurs.
The Progressives sent just two people – National Assembly Speaker Ana Brnabić and Finance Minister Siniša Mali – to seven election campaign debates on four television channels, which testifies to Vučić’s great distrust in his other associates. The student ticket’s aim is as large a turnout as possible, whereas the opposite suits Vučić. He has so far won elections where turnout did not exceed 58 per cent. Aware that winning over others’ voters is very difficult due to extreme polarisation, Vučić has focused on keeping his own and discouraging the voters of rival actors. He has made discrediting opponents (and supporters of the student movement, as well as the organisations that are to control the electoral process) the focus of his campaign, and has to a lesser extent also led a positive campaign, claiming that he is the sole guarantor of stability and progress in society, particularly in the economy.
This is the first Progressive party campaign that is not full of big promises and the first without a memorable positive message, seeing as the main message is that the party’s rivals are traitors who will “destroy Serbia.” In that it resembles the campaign led by Boris Tadić, the leader of the then ruling coalition ahead of the 2012 election, which he lost. Tadić’s central message at the time was that if the Progressives won, Serbia would collapse and “return to the 1990s.” On the other hand, the student ticket’s campaign is extremely engaged and involves a large number of people, and its dominant messages are ones of hope and optimism. During the campaign there have been long marches that recalled those of 18 months ago, at the height of the citizens’ mobilisation against the authorities. The student ticket is responding to the attacks coming from the Progressive party by completely ignoring them.
The authorities
On 16 October Vučić held a rally in Novi Sad that was important to him. After numerous announcements over the past two years, this was Vučić’s first rally in Novi Sad since the deadly collapse of the railway station concrete canopy on 1 November 2024, which led to the creation of the student movement. Vučić had to show up in Novi Sad and thus demonstrate power to his voters, who are predominantly informed by the pro-government media, even though the event took place in highly controlled conditions, with a sizable police presence and numerous Progressive supporters bussed in from other cities and towns. In that way Vučić wanted to show his voters that he still decides where he moves, i.e. what happens in Serbia.
The Novi Sad citizen assemblies and students did not organise a counter-rally; rather, they decided to ignore the Progressive party gathering and called on citizens not to be on the streets during that time. Earlier, citizen assemblies and students warned Vučić not to come to Novi Sad because he was not welcome (the last time was just a month and a half ago), whereas now they changed their stance because elections have been called in the meantime, i.e. because they did not want to prevent their rivals’ election campaign activities and thereby unnecessarily increase tensions.
The other ticket of ruling parties, rallied around Ivica Dačić’s Socialist Party of Serbia, has played the Russian card in an attempt to cross the election threshold. Dačić was recently in Moscow, where he talked with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, his spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, and the body’s secretary, Sergei Shoigu. Dačić said that “any sanctions against Russia are out of the question” and presented a new idea – that Serbia’s foreign policy should rest on a “Serbian three-legged stool” that would comprise Russia, China and, if possible, the U.S. “If not, we can do with two legs,” said Dačić, in the struggle for the votes of anti-Western voters who favour Russia and China.
Affairs
The previous campaign week was also marked by several affairs. In just 72 hours, domestic and foreign media published testimonies and documents that raise new questions about the link between the Serbian authorities and organised crime and corruption. From the testimony of a former Progressive party activist that he had hired violent thugs for party purposes and was involved in vote buying and pressure on voters, through the correspondence via the Sky app which indicates potential arrangements between the criminal clan led by drug lord Darko Šarić and people from the state leadership, to the discovery of Aleksandar Vučić’s role in the General Staff buildings case, published by The Guardian. All the affairs are connected by one name – Vučić.
The attention of the opposition-oriented segment of the public has especially been drawn by the testimony of former Progressive party activist Momčilo Marjanović, which the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) published. Marjanović, a 54-year-old who had been a Progressive activist for more than 10 years, said that since the start of the student protests he had been in charge of organising violent thugs who intimidated and physically assaulted citizens at protests. He said that he received the money for his services and the fees for his men in cash from the director of the heating public utility JP Toplane Novi Sad, Nenad Barać, and that he received more than 400,000 euros from him for those activities in the last two years. He also said that he saw more than 100 people armed with pistols at the pro-government encampment dubbed Ćaciland on 15 March 2025, that the thugs had permission to use all means against the demonstrators if that was demanded of them, and that on that day everything was done in coordination with and with the knowledge of the police.
Then the Radar weekly published messages from communication via the Sky app, previously inaccessible to the public, which shed additional light on the Šarić gang’s connections with the top of the government in Serbia. Radar also reported that the director of the Republic Secretariat for Legislation had on two occasions warned Culture Minister Nikola Selaković of the legal obstacles to abolishing the status of protected cultural asset of the former General Staff complex, but that the proposal was sent to the cabinet anyway. That topic even reached The Guardian, which published an article stating that Vučić himself led a meeting in February 2024 where the participants discussed stripping the General Staff complex of its protected cultural asset status.
The opposition-leaning public last week also learned about the scope of activities of the Progressive “bots” – people whose task is to post comments on social media for the purpose of manipulating public opinion and targeting the regime’s opponents. After the progress.rs platform’s database was leaked and published on the ocisti.net portal, an analysis by the Vreme weekly showed that more than 1,200 users of the platform had logged in from the internet networks of state institutions and public enterprises, and that as much as 94 per cent of those logins were recorded during working hours. That means the Progressive party “bots” were paid with budget money for those activities.
Nevertheless, the affairs whose new details the opposition-oriented public has learned about over the past several days almost certainly will not affect the outcome of the elections. In part because such information does not reach Progressive voters due to tightly controlled media, and in part because those who vote for Vučić most often have no problem with controversial moves made by his regime.
Repression
As election day draws near, there is increasing news of arrests of Vučić’s political opponents. Last week, former Military Union leader Novica Antić was arrested on charges of having committed the criminal offence of causing panic and unrest with a post on X. Antić has been placed under three-month house arrest, with a ban on communication and usage of the internet and social media. The regime’s motive for that measure against Antić is a desire to prevent his potential influence on military veterans’ organisations, with which he is connected, if there are riots in the days after the elections.
On suspicion that he had committed the same criminal offence, the regime issued an arrest warrant for the editor of the Slavija Info YouTube channel, Ljubomir Stefanović, who is now “hiding in a safe place” after police searched his apartment on the same day Antić was arrested. This week, the protesting students announced that police have started searching facilities for the purpose of arresting students. On the accusation that they were “planning riots on election day,” the police arrested multiple people in Novi Sad, Kraljevo and Belgrade on 21 October. Among the arrested are certain members of citizen assemblies and activists of local initiatives.
With these moves the regime is trying to create an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, i.e. to intimidate the opposition voters and discourage them from turning out to vote. However, it is highly unlikely that it will succeed, because the arrests and repression are more likely to cause a counter-effect. Some in the opposition part of the public fear that if he loses the election, Vučić might resort to much stronger repression against all whom the regime considers enemies. Many people believe that Vučić is not ready to surrender power and that in the event of defeat he will not accept his rivals’ victory, which is why 26 October could be the most dangerous day in Serbia’s recent political history. Vučić’s statements can be interpreted as announcements that, if he stays in power after the elections, he will crack down on the remaining opposition, the non-governmental sector and independent media, and that it will de facto become impossible to change the government in Serbia.
The original version of this article by EUalive’s partner BETA can be found here.
Caption: A handout photo made available by the Serbian Presidency shows supporters of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic during a gathering ahead of his resignation in Belgrade, Serbia, 27 September 2026. Vucic announced his resignation ahead of the 25 October 2026 parliamentary elections, paving the way for the Speaker of the National Assembly to assume acting presidential duties as stipulated by the Serbian Constitution. EPA/DIMITRIJE GOLL / SERBIAN PRESIDENCY / HANDOUT
Updated: October 22, 2026 - 06:45

